Why You Should Boycott the UK Biobank

I first came across proposals for the the UK Biobank when I was writing Digital Code of Life in 2004. It's an exciting idea:

UK Biobank aims to study how the health of 500,000 people, currently aged 40-69, from all around the UK is affected by their lifestyle, environment and genes. The purpose of this major project is to improve the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of a wide range of illnesses (such as cancer, heart disease, diabetes, dementia, and joint problems) and to promote health throughout society.

By analysing answers, measurements and samples collected from participants, researchers may be able to work out why some people develop particular diseases while others do not. This should help us to find new ways to prevent early death and disability from many different diseases.

It's all about scaling: when you have vast amounts of information about populations, you can find out all kinds of correlations that would otherwise be obscured.

But as I noted in my book:

Meanwhile, the rise of biobanks - massive collections of DNA that may, like those in Iceland and Estonia, encompass an entire nation - will create tempting targets for data thieves.

This was well before the UK government started losing data like a leaky tap. Naturally, the UK Biobank has something to say on this issue:

Access is kept to a minimum. Very few staff have access to the key code. The computers which hold your information are protected by industry strength firewalls and are tested, so they are safe from hackers.

Sigh. Let's hope they know more about medical research than they do computer security.

But such security intrusions are not my main concern here. Again, as I wrote four years ago:

Governments do not even need to resort to underhand methods: they can simply arrogate to themselves the right to access such confidential information wherever it is stored. One of the questions addressed by the FAQ of a biobank involving half a million people, currently under construction in the United Kingdom, is: "Will the police have access to the information?" The answer - "only under court order" - does not inspire confidence.

I gathered from this blog post that invites are now going out, so I was interested to see what the UK Biobank has to say on the subject now that it has had time to reflect on matters:

Will the police have access to the information?

We will not grant access to the police, the security services or to lawyers unless forced to do so by the courts (and, in some circumstances, we would oppose such access vigorously).

"In some circumstances" - well, thanks a bunch. Clearly, nothing has changed here. The UK government will be able to waltz in anytime it wants and add those temping half a million DNA profiles to the four million it already has. After all, if you have nothing to hide, you can't possibly object.

Given the UK government's obsession with DNA profiles, and its contempt for any idea of privacy, you would be mad to sign up for the UK Biobank at present. Once your DNA is there (in the form of a blood sample), the only thing keeping it out of the government's hands is a quick vote in a supine Parliament.

Much as I'd like to support this idea, I won't have anything to do with it until our glorious leaders purge the current DNA database of the millions of innocent people - and *children* - whose DNA it holds, and shows itself even vaguely trustworthy with something as precious and quintessential as our genomes. And if the UK Biobank wants any credibility with the people whose help it needs, it would be saying the same thing.

Really Googling the Genome

When I wrote a piece for the Guardian four years ago called "Googling the Genome", it was more of a metaphor than a specific warning about Google rummaging through your DNA. But it's a metaphor no more:

A Harvard University scientist backed by Google Inc. and OrbiMed Advisors LLC plans to unlock the secrets of common diseases by decoding the DNA of 100,000 people in the world's biggest gene sequencing project.

The *first* 100,000 people, I think they mean....

Linus Says It's In Our DNA

Simon Willison has picked up a nice quotation from Linus he made a few years back, but what really interests me are some other things he said in the same post:

think about how you and me actually came about - not through any complex design.

Right. "sheer luck".

Well, sheer luck, AND:
- free availability and _crosspollination_ through sharing of "source code", although biologists call it DNA.
- a rather unforgiving user environment, that happily replaces bad versions of us with better working versions and thus culls the herd (biologists often call this "survival of the fittest")
- massive undirected parallel development ("trial and error")

In other words, the open source methodology is hard-wired into us - right down at the level of DNA.

DNA Vu

Now, where have I heard this before?

Today it costs only $300,000 to sequence a person's DNA, and the $100,000 benchmark is in sight. It's an information processing problem, he said. In other words, Moore's Law and genetics are tightly tied. It won't be long before your genome--and your likelihood to get various diseases, live long, be athletic, etc.--will be available in a standard medical test.

The implications for medicine, and its evil twin the insurance industry, are vast. Despite the privacy issues, Venter is in favor of transparency in genomics, so that, for example, you'll be able to "Google a date's DNA," as O'Reilly remarked. Scary? Sure. But "a good idea," Venter said. "Especially if you plan to have children."

Oh yes, I remember:

Consider a not-too-distant future in which personal genomes are readily available. For those with relations affected by a serious medical condition, this will conveniently provide them with any genetic test they need. But it will also offer the rest of us information about our status for these and other, far less serious, autosomal recessive disorders that might similarly manifest themselves in children if we married a fellow carrier.

A bioinformatics program running on a PC could easily check our genomes for all genes associated with the autosomal recessive disorders that had been identified so far. Regular software updates downloaded from the internet - like those for anti-virus programs - would keep our search software abreast of the latest medical research. The question is, how potentially serious does a variant gene's effects have to be for us to care about its presence in our DNA? Down to what level should we be morally obliged to tell our prospective partners - or have the right to ask about?

And just when is the appropriate moment to swap all these delicate DNA details? Before getting married? Before going to bed together? Before even exchanging words? Will there one day be a new class of small, wireless devices that hold our personal genomic profile in order to carry out discreet mutual compatibility checks on nearby potential partners: a green light for genomic joy, a red one for excessive recessive risks?

Given the daunting complexity of the ethical issues raised by knowing the digital code of life in detail, many may opt for the simplest option: not to google it. But even if you refuse to delve within your genome, there are plenty of others who will be keen to do so. Employers and insurance companies would doubtless love to scan your data before giving you a job or issuing a policy. And if your children and grandchildren have any inconvenient or expensive medical condition that they have inherited from one side of the family, they might like to know which - not least, to ensure that they sue the right person.

The Genome Goes Read-Write

Good Craig:

Craig Venter, the controversial DNA researcher involved in the race to decipher the human genetic code, has built a synthetic chromosome out of laboratory chemicals and is poised to announce the creation of the first new artificial life form on Earth.

...

Mr Venter said he had carried out an ethical review before completing the experiment. "We feel that this is good science," he said.

Bad Craig:

He has further heightened the controversy surrounding his potential breakthrough by applying for a patent for the synthetic bacterium.

The old dichotomy....

DNA = Do Not Ask

This will end in tears:

Although the ability to conduct a home DNA test and get the results with relative ease are tempting, the thought of sitting across the kitchen table with a distant cousin-husband may be little too weird to down with the morning coffee.

No (Wo)man is a (Genomic) Island

Biofinformatics is wonderful when it comes to elucidating the structure of genomes. But it can also be applied in other, rather less laudable ways, to allow likely matches to be found on DNA databases even when no DNA sample has been given, thanks to

statistical techniques which match DNA on the database to relatives, according to Dr Pounder, a privacy law specialist at Pinsent Masons, the law firm behind OUT-LAW.COM. These techniques use the genetic fact that an individual's DNA sample is related to the DNA of close family members.

Given enough computing power, we are all family. No (wo)man is a (genomic) island.

Open Genomics, Closed Minds

One of the great things about open genomics - or bioinformatics if you prefer its traditional name - is that it provides a completely objective resolution of all sorts of emotional disputes.

For example, by feeding genomic sequences of various organisms into a computer program, you can produce a tree of life that is remarkably similar to the ones proposed by traditional evolutionary biology. But in this case, there is no subjective judgement: just pure number crunching (although it's worth noting that the trees vary according to the depth of the calculations, so this is not absolute knowledge, only an ever-closer approximation thereto).

Another case in point is the closeness of the relationship between the great apes and humans. Indeed, it is only human arrogance that allows that kind of distinction to be made: a computer would lump them all together on the basis of their DNA.

Against this background, it's surprising how much we naked apes cling to our difference from the hairy kinds: perhaps it makes us feel a little better in the face of the genocide that we are waging against them. However, it looks like things here might be changing at last:

He recognises himself in the mirror, plays hide-and-seek and breaks into fits of giggles when tickled. He is also our closest evolutionary cousin.

A group of world leading primatologists argue that this is proof enough that Hiasl, a 26-year-old chimpanzee, deserves to be treated like a human. In a test case in Austria, campaigners are seeking to ditch the 'species barrier' and have taken Hiasl's case to court. If Hiasl is granted human status - and the rights that go with it - it will signal a victory for other primate species and unleash a wave of similar cases.

...

One of their central arguments will be that a chimpanzee's DNA is 96-98.4 per cent similar to that of humans - closer than the relationship between donkeys and horses.

Sadly, there's a terrible race here: which will we see first - apes recognised as near-equals, or apes razed from the face of the earth? (Via Slashdot.)

Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2007

Because of this:

(1) Deciphering the sequence of the human genome and other advances in genetics open major new opportunities for medical progress. New knowledge about the genetic basis of illness will allow for earlier detection of illnesses, often before symptoms have begun. Genetic testing can allow individuals to take steps to reduce the likelihood that they will contract a particular disorder. New knowledge about genetics may allow for the development of better therapies that are more effective against disease or have fewer side effects than current treatments. These advances give rise to the potential misuse of genetic information to discriminate in health insurance and employment.

(2) The early science of genetics became the basis of State laws that provided for the sterilization of persons having presumed genetic `defects' such as mental retardation, mental disease, epilepsy, blindness, and hearing loss, among other conditions. The first sterilization law was enacted in the State of Indiana in 1907. By 1981, a majority of States adopted sterilization laws to `correct' apparent genetic traits or tendencies. Many of these State laws have since been repealed, and many have been modified to include essential constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. However, the current explosion in the science of genetics, and the history of sterilization laws by the States based on early genetic science, compels Congressional action in this area.

Everybody needs something like this:

legislation establishing a national and uniform basic standard is necessary to fully protect the public from discrimination and allay their concerns about the potential for discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.

And beyond "simple" discrimination, there's going to be stuff like this:

Consider a not-too-distant future in which personal genomes are readily available. For those with relations affected by a serious medical condition, this will conveniently provide them with any genetic test they need. But it will also offer the rest of us information about our status for these and other, far less serious, autosomal recessive disorders that might similarly manifest themselves in children if we married a fellow carrier.

A bioinformatics program running on a PC could easily check our genomes for all genes associated with the autosomal recessive disorders that had been identified so far. Regular software updates downloaded from the internet - like those for anti-virus programs - would keep our search software abreast of the latest medical research. The question is, how potentially serious does a variant gene's effects have to be for us to care about its presence in our DNA? Down to what level should we be morally obliged to tell our prospective partners - or have the right to ask about?

And just when is the appropriate moment to swap all these delicate DNA details? Before getting married? Before going to bed together? Before even exchanging words? Will there one day be a new class of small, wireless devices that hold our personal genomic profile in order to carry out discreet mutual compatibility checks on nearby potential partners: a green light for genomic joy, a red one for excessive recessive risks?

Given the daunting complexity of the ethical issues raised by knowing the digital code of life in detail, many may opt for the simplest option: not to google it. But even if you refuse to delve within your genome, there are plenty of others who will be keen to do so. Employers and insurance companies would doubtless love to scan your data before giving you a job or issuing a policy. And if your children and grandchildren have any inconvenient or expensive medical condition that they have inherited from one side of the family, they might like to know which - not least, to ensure that they sue the right person.

Another group that is likely to be deeply interested in googling your genome are the law enforcement agencies. Currently, DNA is used to match often microscopic samples found at the scene of a crime, for example, with those taken from suspects, by comparing special, short regions of it - DNA "fingerprints". The better the match, the more likely it is that they came from the same individual. Low-cost sequencing technologies would allow DNA samples to be analysed completely - not just to give patterns for matching, but even rough indications of physical and mental characteristics - convenient for rounding up suspects. This is a rather hit-and-miss approach, though, where success depends on pulling in the right people. How much more convenient it would be if everyone's DNA were already to hand, allowing a simple text matching process to find the guilty party.

Nobody ever said digital DNA was going to be easy.

Guilty Even When Proven Innocent

The Great UK DNA Database Lie continues to grow. Despite Government efforts to paint this as a deeply necessary tool to catch all those wicked evil people out there - "if you're innocent, you have nothing to fear" etc. etc. - it is increasingly becoming clear that, in the interests of total control, it is trying to create a DNA database of everyone.

As The Reg explains:

Less than two thirds of people whose profile is stored on the National DNA Database are there for having been cautioned or convicted of a criminal offence, Home Office figures have revealed.

In response to a parliamentary question, John Reid last week responded that 3,457,000 individuals are on the database, but 1,139,445 have no criminal record. The figure is eight times the total of 139,463 reported by the Home Office Earlier in March.

That's over 2% of the UK population that shouldn't be on there: only another 95% to go.

A Future Danger

Criminal profilers are drawing up a list of the 100 most dangerous murderers and rapists of the future even before they commit such crimes, The Times has learnt.

The highly controversial database will be used by police and other agencies to target suspects before they can carry out a serious offence. Pilot projects to identify the highest-risk future offenders have been operating in five London boroughs for the past two months.

At the moment:

Experts from the Metropolitan Police’s Homicide Prevention Unit are creating psychological profiles of likely offenders to predict patterns of criminal behaviour.

But, as everyone knows, psychology is something of a hit-and-miss business, and not really reliable enough or scalable enough for rolling out across a nation. What we really need is something more precise, something more scientific - like a genetic pre-disposition encoded in the genome.

Some people claim to have found certain genomic characteristics of those who commit major crimes; the obvious step would be to screen people's genomes automatically for those genetic elements before they committed the crime they were hardwired to perpetrate, sparing society many problems and expenses.

Since the proof would be scientific, and not merely based on the fallible judgment of a psychologist, the guilty would have no basis to appeal against the sentences imposed upon them. Indeed, even more money could be saved by simply refusing to allow what would be unnecessary appeals in such cases, where the proof of future guilt could be found in nearly every cell of their body.

How fortunate, then, that the UK has the largest DNA database in the world....

The Problems of a Synthetic Biology Commons

Here's a fascinating paper:

Novel artificial genetic systems with twelve bases instead of four. Bacteria that can be programmed to take photographs or form visible patterns. Cells that can count the number of times they divide. A live polio virus "created from scratch using mail-order segments of DNA and a viral genome map that is freely available on the Internet." These are some of the remarkable, and occasionally disturbing, fruits of "synthetic biology," the attempt to construct life starting at the genetic level.

All good stuff, but there's a problem that may be of interest to readers of these posts:

synthetic biology raises with remarkable clarity an issue that has seemed of only theoretical interest until now. It points out a tension between different methods of creating "openness". On the one hand, we have intellectual property law’s insistence that certain types of material remain in the public domain, outside the world of property. On the other, we have the attempt by individuals to use intellectual property rights to create a "commons," just as developers of free and open source software use the leverage of software copyrights to impose requirements of openness on future programmers, requirements greater than those attaching to a public domain work. Intellectual property policy, at least in the United States, specifies things that cannot be covered by intellectual property rights, such as abstract ideas or compilations of unoriginal facts, precisely to leave them "open" to all – the public roads of the intellect. Yet many of the techniques of open source require property rights so that future users and third parties will be bound by the terms of the license. Should we rethink the boundary lines between intellectual property and the public domain as a result?

The UK Biobank Time-bomb

It sounds so exciting, so good:

UK Biobank is a long-term project aimed at building a comprehensive resource for medical researchers. The full project will get underway in 2006, when it will begin to gather information on the health and lifestyle of 500,000 volunteers aged between 40 and 69.

Following consent, each participant will be asked to donate a blood and urine sample, have some standard measurements (such as blood pressure) and complete a confidential lifestyle questionnaire. Over the next 20 to 30 years UK Biobank will allow fully approved researchers to use these resources to study the progression of illnesses such as cancer, heart disease, diabetes and Alzheimer’s disease. From this they hope to develop new and better ways of preventing, diagnosing and treating such problems.

Data and samples will only be used for ethically and scientifically approved research. Issues such as consent, confidentiality, and security of the data are guided by an Ethics and Governance Framework overseen by an independent council chaired by Professor Alastair V. Campbell of Bristol University.

But read the access policy, and you find this:

Access will not be permitted for police or forensic use except where required by court order. It is likely that UK Biobank will take steps to resist access for police or forensic use, in particular by seeking to be represented in all court applications for access in order to defend participants’ trust and public confidence in UK Biobank.

Since court orders can always be taken for granted given the right legislative framework, and since the current UK Government already has such a poor track record for invasive laws that create such frameworks, what this means in practice is that anyone taking part in this otherwise laudable scheme is creating a biological time-bomb.

Inside the main UK Biobank database will be their DNA, just waiting for somebody, someday - perhaps long after their death - to obtain that court order. Then, practically everything genomic about them will be revealed: genetic propensities, biological relationships, you name it. And, of course, it will provide the authorities with a reliable way of tracking them and, to a lesser extent all their children, for ever.

I am sure that the UK Biobank will fight this kind of use; and I am equally sure that they will lose. Which is why my DNA will only form part of such a database over my dead body. Probably literally.

The Great ID FUD

When will they ever learn?

Unlike traditional forms of identification, the VeriChip can’t be lost, stolen, misplaced, or counterfeited.

That's what the human-implantable RFID VeriChip site says. And this is what happened at the Hackers on Planet Earth (HOPE) 6 conference:

two presenters demonstrated the electronic equivalent of making a copy of an implanted RFID or radio frequency ID chip.

The point was to show just how easy it is to fool a detection device that purports to uniquely identify any individual.

So let's just do a quick recap: which technologies are available for establishing identity unambiguously these days?

Irises: nope
Faces: nope
Fingerprints: nope
DNA: nope
Implanted RFID: nope

So, tell me Mr Blair, how exactly you were going to implement this ID card system in a way that it can't be spoofed to hell?

First Catch Your Neanderthal

This stuff is getting too easy.

First, find some ancient remains - Croatian Neanderthal bones are great. Next, sequence lots - at least 20 times coverage. Don't worry if all you're getting are tiny fragments with around 100 DNA letters, and the signal is vastly swamped by bacterial noise. Just bung the results into a computer, and tell it (a) to cancel out all bacterial genome sequences (b) to join up all the rest. Result: one Neanderthal genome.

There's just one problem:

If the Neanderthal genome were fully recovered, it might in principle be possible to bring the species back from extinction by inserting the Neanderthal genome into a human egg and having volunteers bear Neanderthal infants. There would, however, be great technical and ethical barriers to any such venture.

Understatement of the Year, Number 369.

The Open Body, Biometric Spoofing and ID Cards

Our bodies are open. That is, unless we are planning some criminal activity, we do not try to hide the basic physical facts about ourselves - our voice, our face, our eyes, our fingerprints. Unfortunately, these are precisely the characteristics that biometric ID schemes depend on for verification. This is tantamount to walking around with a large sign saying "my password is xxxx".

And this isn't just my opinion. Here's what one Bori Toth, biometric research and advisory lead at Deloitte & Touche, no less, has to say on the subject:

Many people are trying to regard biometrics as secret but they aren't. Our faces and irises are visible and our voices are being recorded. Fingerprints and DNA are left everywhere we go and it's been proved that these are real threats.

So the use of precisely these spoofable biometrics is just one more reason to bin the whole idiotic ID card idea, which rather depends on them being foolproof. (Via Slashdot.)

The World's First Open Source Man

The genome – the totality of DNA found in practically every cell in our body - is a kind of computer program, stored on 23 pairs of biological DVDs, called chromosomes. Within each chromosome, there are thousands of special sub-routines known as genes. Between the genes lie stretches of the main program that calls the subroutines, as well as spacing elements to make the code more legible, and non-functional comments – doubtless deeply cool when they were first written – that have by now lost all their meaning for us.

DNA's digital code – written not in binary, but quaternary (usually represented by the initials of the four chemicals that store it: A, C, G and T) – is run in a wide range of cellular computers, using a central processing unit (known as a ribosome), and with various initial values and time-dependent inputs supplied in a special format, as proteins. The cell computer produces similarly-formatted outputs, which may act on both itself and other cells.

Thanks to a far-sighted agreement known as the Bermuda Principles, the digital code that lies at the heart of life is freely available from three main databases: one each in the US, UK and Japan. As a result, the DNA that was obtained through the Human Genome Project is open source's greatest triumph.

But so far, no human genome can be said to represent any single human being: that of the Human Genome Project is in fact a composite, made up of a couple of dozen anonymous donors. But soon, all that will change; for the first time, the complete genome of a single person will be placed in the public databases for anyone to download and to use, creating in effect the world's first open source man.

His name is Craig Venter, and for nearly two decades he has been simultaneously revered and reviled as one of the most innovative researchers in the world of genomics. He was the person behind the company Celera that sought to sequence the human genome before the public Human Genome Project, with the aim of patenting as much of it as possible. Fortunately, the Human Genome Project managed to stitch together the thousands of DNA fragments it had analysed – not least thanks to some serious hardware running GNU/Linux – and to put its own human genome in the public domain, thus thwarting Celera's plans to make it proprietary.

A nice twist to this story is that it turned out that Celera's DNA sequence was not, as originally claimed, another composite, but came almost entirely from one person: Craig Venter himself. So his latest project is in many ways simply the completion of this earlier attempt to become the first human with a fully-sequenced genome. The difference now, though, it that it will be in the public databases, and hence accessible by anyone.

This will have profound consequences. Aside from placing his DNA fingerprint out in the open – which will certainly be handy for any police forces that wish to investigate Venter – it means that anyone can analyse his DNA for anything. At the very least, scientists will be able to carry out tests for genetic pre-dispositions to all kinds of common and not-so-common diseases.

So it might happen that a laboratory somewhere discovers that Venter is carrying a genetic variant that has potentially serious health implications. Most of us will be able to choose whether to take such tests and hence whether to know the results, which is just as well. In the case of incurable diseases, for example, the knowledge that there is a high probability – perhaps even certainty – that you will succumb at some point in the future is not very useful unless there is a cure or at least a treatment available. Venter no longer has that choice. Whether he wants it or not, others can carry out the test and announce the result; since Venter is a scientific celebrity and a public figure, he is bound to get to hear about it one way or another.

So while his decision to sequence his genome might be seen as the ultimate act of egotism, by choosing to publish the result he will in fact be providing science with a wonderfully rich resource - the complete code of his life - and at some considerable risk, if only psychological, to himself.

Open Source Evolution

Carl Zimmer is one of the best science writers around today. He manages to combine technical accuracy with a writing style that never gets in the way of his argument. So I was delighted to see this piece on his blog, entitled: "In the Beginning Was Linux?", which includes the following section:

Biologists have long recognized some striking parallels between genes and software. Genes stored information in a language of DNA, with the four nucleotides serving as its alphabet. A genetic code allowed cells to translate the information in genes into the separate language of proteins, which used an alphabet of twenty amino acids. From one generation to the next, mutations introduced slight tweaks to the software. Sex combined different versions of subroutines. If the software performed better--in the sense that an organism had more reproductive success--the changes might become incorporated into the genome across an entire species.

Now, this is amusingly close to the opening chapter (and central idea) of Digital Code of Life, but Zimmer goes further by drawing on the theories of Carl Woese, one of the most original thinkers about how life might have evolved in the earliest stages. It would take too long to explain the details to non-biologists, so I won't attempt it here - not least because Zimmer has already done with customary clarity in his post. Do read it.

A Study in Official Openness

It is probably hard for those outside the UK to appreciate the extent of the secrecy that has pervaded public life here for centuries. The clearest manifestation of this is the pernicious Official Secrets Act, which makes pretty much anything a secret if the Government says it is.

Against this presumption that the public has no right to know anything, the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 2000 was a major milestone, and credit must be given to the current Government for finally making it a reality. This is especially the case since it is clear that the information released by Act is proving a major embarrassment at times, thanks to both an increasingly demanding public and a commendably independent commissioner, Richard Thomas.

As the foreword to his first Annual Report makes clear, he is acutely aware of the central position that his department occupies in today's world, where there is an inevitable tension between his two main tasks: promoting openness and protecting privacy:

Never before has the threat of intrusion to people’s privacy been such a risk. It is no wonder that the public now ranks protecting personal information as the third most important social concern. As technology develops in a globalised 24/7 culture, power increases to build comprehensive insights into daily lives. As internet shopping, smart card technology and joined-up e-government initiatives reduce costs, respond to customers’ demands and improve public services, more and more information is accumulated about us. According to one estimate, information about the average working adult is stored on some 700 databases. New information is added every day. Much of this will be confidential material which we do not want others to see or use unless we say so. There are obvious risks that information is matched with the wrong person or security is breached. The risks increase substantially as information is shared from one database to another, or access granted to another group of users. Real damage can arise when things go wrong – careers and personal relationships can be jeopardised by inaccurate information. Identity theft can involve substantial financial loss and loss of personal autonomy.

The vast majority of information that is held on adults, and increasingly on children, serves a useful purpose and is well intentioned. But everyone recognises that there must be limits. Data protection provides the framework. It raises questions about where lines should be drawn. What is acceptable and what is unacceptable? What safeguards are needed? What is the right balance between public protection and private life? How long, for example, should phone and internet traffic records be retained for access by police and intelligence services fighting terrorism? Whose DNA should be held, and for how long, to help solve crime? What safeguards are needed for commercial internet-based tracking services which leave no hiding place?

All power to Mr Thomas' elbow.

The Barcode of Life

Since DNA is digital information, it is, essentially, a number. A very, very, very big number. And because nearly every cell in a living thing contains the same genome, unique to the individual (leaving aside twins etc.), in principle this means that every being is barcoded in every cell.

Of course, in practice, this isn't much help, since sequencing is still pretty costly. But we don't need all those several million/billion DNA letters to barcode life: a few hundred will do, if chosen judiciously.

That's precisely what the group with the wonderfully literal name of "The Consortium for the Barcode of Life" has come up with. This Wired report brings us up to date on the bird part of the project (there's a fishy one too) that will eventually turn every species - if not every individual - into a number. That's a later project that governments around the world will carry out as a follow-up (did anyone say ID card?).