15 February 2023
08 January 2018
Incoming: Spare Slots for Freelance Work in 2018
Posted by Glyn Moody at 10:08 am 0 comments
Labels: ceta, china, copyright, encryption, europe, free software, freedom of speech, open access, open data, open science, open source, patents, privacy, surveillance, tisa, tpp, trade secrets, TTIP
04 January 2017
Spare Slots for Regular Freelance Work Soon Available
Posted by Glyn Moody at 11:45 am 0 comments
Labels: china, copyright, digital rights, europe, free software, freelance, journalism, linux, open access, open source
26 July 2014
Microsoft Goes Open Access; When Will It Go Open Source?
Even though Microsoft is no longer the dominant player or pacesetter in the computer industry -- those roles are shared by Google and Apple these days -- it still does interesting work through its Microsoft Research arm. Here's some welcome news from the latter: it's moving to open access for its researchers' publications.
On Techdirt.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 12:58 pm 0 comments
Labels: Microsoft, open access, open source, techdirt
25 July 2014
Open Source Genomics
There's a revolution underway. It's digital, but not in the computing sector. I'm referring to the world of genomics, which deals with the data that resides inside all living things: DNA. As most people know, DNA uses four chemical compounds - adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine - to encode various structures, most notably proteins, which are represented by stretches of DNA called genes.
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 1:32 pm 0 comments
Labels: DNA, genomics, open enterprise, open source
24 July 2014
Resisting Surveillance on a Unprecedented Scale III
Or maybe not. There is a rough consensus among cryptography experts that the theoretical underpinnings of encryption - the mathematical foundations - remain untouched. The problem lies in the implementation and the environment in which encryption is used. Edward Snowden probably knows better than most what the true situation is, and here's how he put it:
Encryption works. Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on. Unfortunately, endpoint security is so terrifically weak that NSA can frequently find ways around it.
That's a hugely important clue as to what we need to do. It tells us that there is nothing wrong with crypto as such, just the corrupted implementations of otherwise strong encryption techniques. That is confirmed by recent leaks of information that show computer software companies complicit in weakening the supposedly safe products they sell - truly a betrayal of the trust placed in them by their customers.
The good news is that we have an alternative. For the last few decades, free software/open source has been building a software ecosystem that is outside the control of the traditional computer industry. That makes it much harder for the NSA to subvert, since the code is developed openly, which allows anyone to inspect it and look for backdoors - secret ways to spy on and control the software.
That's not to say free software is completely immune to security issues. Many open source products come from companies, and it's possible that some of them may have been pressured to weaken aspects of their work. Free software applications might be subverted as they are converted from the source code, which can be easily checked for backdoors, to the binaries - the versions that actually run on a computer - which can't. There is also potential for online holdings of open source programs to be broken into and tampered with in subtle ways.
Despite those problems, open source is still the best hope we have when it comes to using strong encryption. But in the wake of Snowden's revelations, the free software community needs to take additional precautions so as to minimise the risk that code is still vulnerable to attacks and subversion by spy agencies.
Beyond such measures, the open source world should also start thinking about writing a new generation of applications with strong crypto built in. These already exist, but are often hard to use. More needs to be done to make them appropriate for general users: the latter may not care much about the possibility that the NSA or GCHQ is monitoring everything they do online, but if they are offered great tools that make it easy to resist such efforts, more people may adopt them, just as millions have switched to the Firefox browser - not because it supports open standards, but because it is better.
Although the scale of the spying revealed by Snowden's leaks is staggering, and the leaks about the thoroughgoing and intentional destruction of the Internet's entire trust and security systems are shocking, there is no reason for despair. Even in the face of widespread public ignorance and indifference to the threat such total surveillance represents to democracy, as far as we know we can still use strong encryption implemented in open source software to protect our privacy.
Indeed, this may be an opportunity for open source to be embraced by a wider public, since we now know definitively that commercial software cannot be trusted, and is effectively spyware that you have to pay for. And just as Moore's Law allows the NSA and GCHQ to pull in and analyse ever-more of our data, so free software, too, can benefit.
For as Moore's Law continues to drive down the prices of personal computing devices - whether PCs, smartphones or tablets - so more people in developing countries around the world are able to acquire them. Many will adopt free software, since Western software companies often price their products at unreasonably-high levels compared to local disposable income. As open source is used more widely, so the number of people keen and able to contribute to such projects will grow, the software will improve, and more people will use it. In other words, there is a virtuous circle that produces its own kind of scaling that will help to counteract the more malign kind that underlies the ever-expanding surveillance activities of the NSA and GCHQ. As well as tools of repression, computers can also be tools of resistance when powered by free software, which is called that for a reason.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 11:08 am 0 comments
Labels: netzpolitik, nsa, open enterprise, open source, snowden, surveillance
Resisting Surveillance on a Unprecedented Scale II
The gradual but relentless shift from piecemeal, small-scale analogue eavesdropping to constant and total surveillance may also help to explain the public's relative equanimity in the face of these revelations. Once we get beyond the facile idea that if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear - everybody has something to hide, even if it is only the private moments in their lives - there is another common explanation that people offer as to why they are not particularly worried about the activities of the NSA and GCHQ. This is that "nobody would be interested" in what they are up to, and so they are confident that they have not been harmed by the storage and analysis of the Internet data.
This is based on a fundamentally analogue view of what is going on. These people are surely right that no spy is sitting at a keyboard reading their emails or Facebook posts. That's clearly not possible, even if the will were there. But it's not necessary, since the data can be "read" by tireless programs that extract key information at an accelerating pace and diminishing cost thanks to Moore's Law.
People are untroubled by this because most of them can't imagine what today's top computers can do with their data, and think again in analogue terms - the spy sifting slowly through so much information as to be swamped. And that's quite understandable, since even computer experts struggle to keep up with the pace of development, and to appreciate the ramifications.
A post on the Google Search blog from last year may help to provide some sense of just how powerful today's systems are:
When you enter a single query in the Google search box, or just speak it to your phone, you set in motion as much computing as it took to send Neil Armstrong and eleven other astronauts to the moon. Not just the actual flights, but all the computing done throughout the planning and execution of the 11-year, 17 mission Apollo program. That’s how much computing has advanced.
Now add in the fact that three billion Google queries are entered each day, and that the NSA's computing capability is probably vastly greater than Google's, and you have some idea of the raw power available for the analysis of the "trivial" data gathered about all of us, and how that might lead to very non-trivial knowledge about our most intimate lives.
In terms of how much information can be held, a former NSA technical director, William Binney, estimates that one NSA data centre currently being built in Utah will be able to handle and process five zettabytes of data - that's five million million gigabytes. If you were to print out that information as paper documents, and store them in traditional filing cabinets, it would require around 42 million million cabinets occupying 17 million square kilometres of floor space.
Neither computing power nor the vast holdings of personal data on their own are a direct threat to our privacy and freedom But putting them together means that the NSA can not only find anything in those 42 million million virtual cabinets more or less instantly, but that it can cross-reference any word on any piece of paper in any cabinet - something that can't even be contemplated as an option for human operators, let alone attempted.
It is this unprecedented ability to consolidate all the data about us, along with the data of our family, friends and acquaintances, and their family, friends and acquaintances (and sometimes even the acquaintances of our acquaintances' acquaintances) that creates the depth of knowledge the NSA has at its disposal whenever it wants it. And while it is unlikely to call up that knowledge for most of us, it only takes a tiny anomalous event somewhere deep in the chain of acquaintance for a suspicion to propagate back through the links to taint all our innocent records, and to cause them to be added to the huge pile of data that will cross-referenced and sifted and analysed in the search for significant patterns so deep that we are unlikely to be aware of them.
Given this understandable, if regrettable, incomprehension on the part of the public about the extraordinary power at the disposal of the NSA, and what it might be able to extract as a result, the key question then becomes: what can we do to bolster our privacy? Until a few weeks ago, most people working in this field would have said "encrypt everything". But the recent revelations that the NSA and GCHQ have succeeded in subverting just about every encryption system that is widely used online seem to destroy even that last hope.
(In tomorrow's instalment: the way forward.)
Posted by Glyn Moody at 11:06 am 0 comments
Labels: netzpolitik, nsa, open enterprise, open source, snowden, surveillance
Resisting Surveillance on a Unprecedented Scale I
Despite being a journalist who has been writing about the Internet for 20 years, and a Briton who has lived under the unblinking eye of millions of CCTV cameras for nearly as long, I am nonetheless surprised by the revelations of Edward Snowden. I have always had a pretty cynical view of governments and their instruments of power such as the police and secret services; I have always tried to assume the worst when it comes to surveillance and the assaults on my privacy. But I never guessed that the US and UK governments, aided and abetted to varying degrees by other countries, could be conducting what amounts to total, global surveillance of the kind revealed by Snowden's leaked documents.
I don't think I'm alone in this. Even though some people are now claiming this level of surveillance was "obvious", and "well-known" within the industry, that's not my impression. Judging by the similarly shocked and outraged comments from many defenders of civil liberties and computer experts, particularly in the field of security, they, like me, never imagined that things were quite this bad. That raises an obvious question: how did it happen?
Related to that outrage in circles that concern themselves with these issues, is something else that needs explaining: the widespread lack of outrage among ordinary citizens. To be sure, some countries are better than others in understanding the implications of what has been revealed to us by Snowden (and some are worse - the UK in particular). But given the magnitude and thoroughgoing nature of the spying that is being conducted on our online activities, the response around the world has been curiously muted. We need to understand why, otherwise the task of rolling back at least some of the excesses will be rendered even more difficult.
The final question that urgently requires thought is what can, in fact, be done? Since the level of public concern is relatively low, even in those countries that are traditionally sensitive about privacy issues - Germany, for example - what are the alternatives to stricter government controls, which seem unlikely to be forthcoming?
Although there was a Utopian naivety in the mid-1990s about what the Internet might bring about, it has been clear for a while that the Internet has its dark side, and could be used to make people less, not more, free. This has prompted work to move from a completely open network, with information sent unencrypted, to one where Web connections using the HTTPS technology shield private information from prying eyes. It's remarkable that it has only been in recent years that the pressure to move to HTTPS by default has grown strong.
That's perhaps a hint of how the current situation of total surveillance has arisen. Although many people knew that unencrypted data could be intercepted, there was a general feeling that it wouldn't be possible to find the interesting streams amongst the huge and growing volume flooding every second of the day through the series of digital tubes that make up the Internet.
But that overlooked one crucial factor: Moore's Law, and its equivalents for storage and connectivity. Crudely stated, this asserts that the cost of a given computational capability will halve every 18 months or so. Put another way, for a given expenditure, the available computing power doubles every year and half. And it's important to remember that this is geometric growth: after ten years, Moore's Law predicts computing power increases by a factor of around 25 for a given cost.
Now add in the fact that the secret services are one of the least constrained when it comes to spending money on the latest and fastest equipment, since the argument can always be made that the extra power will be vitally important in getting information that could save lives and so on. One of the first and most extraordinary revelations conveyed from Snowden by the Guardian gave an insight into how that extra and constantly increasing computing power is being applied, in what was called the Tempora programme:
By the summer of 2011, GCHQ had probes attached to more than 200 internet links, each carrying data at 10 gigabits a second. "This is a massive amount of data!" as one internal slideshow put it. That summer, it brought NSA analysts into the Bude trials. In the autumn of 2011, it launched Tempora as a mainstream programme, shared with the Americans.
The intercept probes on the transatlantic cables gave GCHQ access to its special source exploitation. Tempora allowed the agency to set up internet buffers so it could not simply watch the data live but also store it - for three days in the case of content and 30 days for metadata.
As that indicates, two years ago the UK's GCHQ was pulling in data at the rate of 2 terabits a second: by now it is certain to be far higher than that. Thanks to massive storage capabilities, GCHQ could hold the complete Internet flow for three days, and its metadata for 30 days.
There is one very simple reason why GCHQ is doing this: because at some point it realised it could, not just practically, because of Moore's Law, but also legally. The UK legislation that oversees this activity - the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) - was passed in 2000, and drawn up based on the experience of the late 1990s. It was meant to regulate one-off interception of individuals, and most of it is about carrying out surveillance of telephones and the postal system. In other words, it was designed for an analogue world. The scale of the digital surveillance now taking place is so far beyond what was possible ten years ago, that RIPA's framing of the law - never mind its powers - are obsolete, and GCHQ is essentially able to operate without either legal or technical constraints.
(In tomorrow's instalment: why isn't the public up in arms over this?)
Posted by Glyn Moody at 11:04 am 0 comments
Labels: netzpolitik, nsa, open enterprise, open source, snowden, surveillance
26 January 2014
Interview: Linus Torvalds - "I don't read code any more"
(This was originally published in The H Open in November 2012.)
I was lucky enough to interview Linus quite early in the history of Linux – back in 1996, when he was still living in Helsinki (you can read the fruits of that meeting in this old Wired feature.) It was at an important moment for him, both personally – his first child was born at this time – and in terms of his career. He was about to join the chip design company Transmeta, a move that didn't really work out, but led to him relocating to America, where he remains today.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 10:44 am 0 comments
Labels: diving, git, h open, interview, kernel, linus, linus torvalds, open source
23 November 2013
Will CyanogenMod Get the Business Blues?
Last week, I wrote an article pointing out that the NSA's assault on cryptography, bad as it was, had a silver lining for open source, which was less vulnerable to being subverted than closed-source applications produced by companies. However, that raises the question: what about the mobile world?
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 5:24 pm 0 comments
Labels: android, cyanogenmod, nsa, open enterprise, open source
UK Gov: Smaller, Better, Faster, Stronger...Opener.
One of the recurrent themes on this blog has been the UK government's use - or failure to use - open source and open data. To be fair, on the open data side, things are going pretty well. Open source was previously conspicuous by its absence, and that is finally changing, albeit rather slower than many of us would wish.
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 11:09 am 0 comments
Labels: open enterprise, open source, UK
How Network Neutrality Promotes Innovation
As I've pointed out many times in previous posts, one of the key benefits of mandating network neutrality is that it promotes innovation by creating a level playing field. Such statements are all very well, but where's the evidence? An important new study entitled "The innovation-enhancing effects of network neutrality" [.pdf], commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs from the independent SEO Economic Research unit provides perhaps the best survey and analysis of why indeed network neutrality is so beneficial:
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 11:07 am 0 comments
Labels: innovation, net neutrality, open enterprise, open source
A New Chapter for Open Source?
Back in April, I wrote about in interesting new venture from the Linux Foundation called the OpenDaylight Project. As I pointed out then, what made this significant was that it showed how the Linux Foundation was beginning to move beyond its historical origins of supporting the Linux ecosystem, towards the broader application of the important lessons it has learnt about open source collaboration in the process. Following that step, we now have this:
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 11:05 am 0 comments
Labels: linux foundation, open enterprise, open source
Open Source in the UK: Sharing the Fire
As even a cursory glance at articles on Open Enterprise over the last few years will indicate, open source is a massive success in practically every market. Except, unfortunately, on the desktop (famously) and more, generally, for consumers. And as Aral Balkan points out in an important post from a few weeks ago, that's a real problem:
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 10:59 am 0 comments
Labels: aral balkan, open enterprise, open source, prometheus
Is Apache the Most Important Open Source Project?
Back in the mists of time - I'm talking about 2000 here - when free software was still viewed by many as a rather exotic idea, I published a book detailing its history up to that point. Naturally, I wrote about Apache (the Web server, not the foundation) there, since even in those early days it was already the sectoral leader. As I pointed out:
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 10:53 am 0 comments
Labels: apache, open enterprise, open source, Rebel Code
Is This Finally the Year of Open Source...in China?
One of the long-running jokes in the free software world is that this year will finally be the year of open source on the desktop - just like it was last year, and the year before that. Thanks to the astounding rise of Android, people now realise that the desktop is last decade's platform, and that mobile - smartphones and tablets - are the future. But I'd argue that there is something even more important these, and that is the widespread deployment of open source in China.
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 10:52 am 0 comments
Labels: china, desktop, open enterprise, open source
27 October 2013
Could Open Source Make GMOs More Palatable?
As a recent DailyDirt noted, opinions on the safety of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are sharply divided. But that heated argument tends to obscure another problem that Techdirt has often written about in other fields: the use of patent monopolies to exert control, in this case over the food chain. By inserting DNA sequences into plants and animals and obtaining patents, the biotech industry is granted surprisingly wide-ranging powers over how its products are used, as the Bowman case made clear. That's potentially problematic when those products are the foods that keep us alive.
On Techdirt.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 9:58 am 0 comments
Labels: DNA, gmos, open source, patents, techdirt
19 September 2013
Another Reason Why Open Source Wins: Fairness
I've written a number of posts looking at less-familiar advantages of open source over closed source, and here's another one. Proprietary systems can't be forked, which means that it's not possible to change the underlying ethos, for example by tweaking the software or using code on a different platform. But you can with open source, as this interesting example shows.
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 7:27 pm 0 comments
Labels: fairness, open enterprise, open source
18 September 2013
Why We Need Open Source: Three Cautionary Tales
Open Enterprise mostly writes about "obvious" applications of open source - situations where money can be saved, or control regained, by shifting from proprietary to open code. That battle is more or less won: free software is widely recognised as inherently superior in practically all situations, as its rapid uptake across many markets demonstrates. But there are also some circumstances where it may not be so obvious that open source is the solution, because it's not always clear what the problem is.
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 7:49 pm 0 comments
Labels: open enterprise, open source
Happy 10th Anniversary, Groklaw
One of the amazing things about free software is how it has managed to succeed against all the odds - and against the combined might of some of the world's biggest and most wealthy companies. That shows two things, I think: the power of a simple idea like open collaboration, and how individuals, weak on their own, collectively can achieve miracles.
On Open Enterprise blog.
Posted by Glyn Moody at 7:46 pm 0 comments
Labels: collaboration, groklaw, open enterprise, open source