London Police To Extract Data From Suspects' Mobile Phones -- And Keep It Even If No Charges Are Brought

As the mobile phone moves closer to the center of daily life in many parts of the world, combining phone, computer, camera, diary, music player, and much else all in one, it becomes a concentrated store of the digital DNA that defines us -- who we talk to, what we search for, who we meet, what we listen to. However convenient that may be for us as users, it's also extremely dangerous if it falls into the wrong hands.

On Techdirt.

Why Extending the DNA Database is Dangerous

Part of the problem with extending the DNA database is that doing so increases the likelihood of this happening:

After a seven-day trial, Jama had been convicted of raping a 40-year-old woman in the toilets at a suburban nightclub.

The only evidence linking him to the crime was a DNA sample taken from the woman's rape kit.

...

Jama had steadfastly denied the charge of rape and said he had never been to that nightclub, not on that cold Melbourne night, not ever. He repeatedly stated he was with his critically ill father on the other side of Melbourne, reading him passages from the Koran.

But the judge and the jury did not buy his alibi, despite supporting evidence from his father, brother and friend. Instead, they believed the forensic scientist who testified there was a one in 800 billion chance that the DNA belonged to someone other than the accused man.

This week Jama gave the lie to that absurdly remote statistic. After prosecutors admitted human error in the DNA testing on which the case against Jama was built, his conviction was overturned.

Prosecutors said they could not rule out contamination of the DNA sample after it emerged the same forensic medical officer who used the rape kit had taken an earlier sample from Jama in an unrelated matter. They admitted a "serious miscarriage of justice".

DNA is an important forensic tool - when used properly. But it is not foolproof, not least because contamination can lead to false positives.

The more DNA profiles that are stored on a database, the more likely there will be a match found due to such false positives. And such is the belief in the infallibility of DNA testing - thanks to the impressive-sound "one in 800 billion chance that the DNA belonged to someone other than the accused man" - that it is likely to lead to more *innocent* people being convicted. The best solution is to keep the DNA database small, tight and useful.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca.

Why the UK's “Smarter Government” Plan is Not So Clever

There's no doubt that the area outside computing where the ideas underlying open source are being applied most rapidly and most successfully is that of open government. Alongside the US, which is has made great strides in this area, Australia, too, has caught the transparency bug. So what about Blighty?

On Open Enterprise blog.

A Proportionate Response to "Proportionate"

There is a nauseating piece of troll-bait in the Guardian today. It's called "My DNA dilemma", and in it Alan Johnson attempts to convince readers he suffers as much as any of us bleeding-heart liberals at the thought of the terrible, terrible sacrifices of freedom we must make for the sake of security.

I won't bother demolishing the rickety edifice of its spin and half-truths, since that has been done expertly elsewhere. Instead, I'd like to concentrate on the key argument of the piece, implicit in its title:

This is a classic home secretary dilemma. It is not a clear-cut choice between liberty and security – between siding with the civil liberties lobby or the forces of law and order. The far less headline-friendly reality is the need to balance all these factors – protecting the public, but in a way that's proportionate to the threat. I believe that the government's proposals do precisely that but I also welcome the debate as a necessary part of implementing such sensitive measures.

There's a tell-tale word in there that I have been tracking for many months as it silently worms its way into public discourse in this country: "proportionate".

It's the ultimate argument-killer when people raise the big issues like liberty to defend themselves from ever-more intrusive "security" legislation - which strangely always turns out to be "surveillance" of the little people like you and me. Yes, it seems to say, you're right, this *is* a tricky one, but we must find a compromise "to balance all these factors", as Alan Johnson puts it. And the way we do that is by making a *proportionate* response.

How could anyone argue with something so reasonable? After all, that's exactly what we all want: a proportionate response that represents a compromise position.

There's just one little problem. As the UK government has shown by its use of this word time and again to justify everything from ID cards and policing to Internet monitoring and DNA databases, what they really mean is: we're going to do what we've said because it's what we've decided. In effect, this use of "proportionate response" is simply shorthand for the tautological "our response", but dressed up in a costume of apparent concession.

If you don't think this is a serious problem, just watch out next time you read or hear a government discussion of why they realise something is a contentious area, and that there are many people who disagree profoundly: I can almost guarantee that at some point they will roll out the "p"-word, and that will be the end of the argument - because if you argue for something else, you are clearly *against* a proportionate solution, and can therefore be dismissed as part of the lunatic fringe.

Because it is such a slippery, weaselly word, I think we need to try to pre-empt these attempts by claiming immediately that *our* solutions are proportionate. Then, when the government inevitably claims the same for theirs, it comes down to a slanging match - which at least makes it clear that there is no "consensus".

The more we point out the UK government's constant invocation of "proportionate" responses to hide a complete refusal to engage with critics - despite Alan Johnson claiming to "welcome the debate" - the sooner it will drop that tactic. It might not start to listen - that would be too much to hope - but at least we will have reduced the verbal undergrowth in which it can hide.

So, please pass it on about the UK government's "proportionate" meme: after all, it's a proportionate response.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca.

The Utter Moral Bankruptcy of the DNA Database

This is staggering:

Detections using the national DNA database have fallen over the past two years despite the number of profiles increasing by 1m and its running costs doubling to £4.2m a year.

A report on the database covering the years 2007-09, published today, shows that crimes cleared up as a result of a match on the DNA database fell from 41,148 to 31,915 over the period. At the same time the number of DNA profiles on the database – already the largest in the world – rose from 4.6m to 5.6m. Duplicates mean that the police database now holds details of 4.89 million individuals.

That is, despite increasing the size to getting on for 10% of the UK population, the number of crimes cleared *fell* by over 25%. How pathetic is that? Not as pathetic as this statement from the truly Orwellian "National Policing Improvement Agency":

Nevertheless, Peter Neyroud, the head of the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), which hosts the DNA database, says in the report that it continues to provide the police with the most effective tool for the prevention and detection of crime since the development of fingerprint analysis more than a century ago.

Against the background that this "most effective tool for the prevention and detection of crime since the development of fingerprint analysis more than a century ago" is getting ever-less effective and more costly, and infringing on the rights of ever more people, this statement proves just one thing: that the British police are getting more and more incompetent, and have to rely on more and more Draconian laws and tools just to stop their already footling success rate dropping even more precipitously.

This is an utter scandal on so many levels, but above all because the UK government is continuing to foist this intrusive, disproportionate, racist and morally repugnant approach upon us when it's *own figures* demonstrate that it is failing more and more each year.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca.

DNA Database Doomed: It Works Too Well

This is something I've been saying (without proof, admittedly) for a while: the UK's insane DNA database is doomed not because it doesn't work well, but because it works *too* well in a sense - in that it lets you frame anybody with perfect efficiency:

Scientists in Israel have demonstrated that it is possible to fabricate DNA evidence, undermining the credibility of what has been considered the gold standard of proof in criminal cases.

The scientists fabricated blood and saliva samples containing DNA from a person other than the donor of the blood and saliva. They also showed that if they had access to a DNA profile in a database, they could construct a sample of DNA to match that profile without obtaining any tissue from that person.

“You can just engineer a crime scene,” said Dan Frumkin, lead author of the paper, which has been published online by the journal Forensic Science International: Genetics. “Any biology undergraduate could perform this.”

This is actually an argument against expanding the database: what you want are just the real criminals, not all those who might possibly one day be one. The bigger the database, the more likely you will get a match with fake DNA.

Needless to say, our great and glorious government will ignore completely this inconvenient truth, and go on stuffing its database with DNA - the reason being this isn't about crime, but about control.

Still, looking on the bright side, it will be trivially easy to spread Gordon Brown's DNA at any crime scene in the future - all we need is a discarded coffee cup....

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter and identi.ca.

DNA Database Breached in New Zealand

Yesterday, I wrote about how the UK ID database has been breached even before it formally exists; now here's another tale that shows what the problem with all such super-duper databases is:

Police are investigating a claim an Environmental Science and Research worker made an "inappropriate disclosure" from the DNA databank.

ESR said yesterday a criminal investigation had started. "A staff member has been suspended pending the outcome of the police and internal investigations," a spokeswoman said.

Which means that *every* database, ultimately, has a weak link: people. So all these assurances of cast-iron, unbreakable security are worthless, for the simple reason that these databases are designed to be used by people, not all of whom are trustworthy or unblackmailable....

DNA Database Doublecross

Oh, look, what a surprise: the UK government's plans implement a European human rights ruling that the "blanket" retention of suspects' data is unlawful proves to be a typical quibble about what "removing" the profiles means:

The genetic profiles of hundreds of ­thousands of innocent people are to be kept on the national DNA database for up to 12 years in a decision critics claim is designed to sidestep a European human rights ruling that the "blanket" retention of suspects' data is unlawful.

The proposed new rules for the national DNA database to be put forward tomorrow by the home secretary, Jacqui Smith, include plans to keep the DNA profiles of innocent people who are arrested but not convicted of minor offences for six years.

The proposal would also apply to children from age 10 who are arrested but never successfully prosecuted.

In cases of more serious violent and sexual crime, innocent people's genetic codes will be kept for 12 years.

It was widely expected that the DNA profiles, samples and fingerprints of 850,000 innocent people kept on the database would be destroyed in response to the ruling by the European court of human rights last December.

Yet again this government shows its deep contempt for international courts, and demonstrates its profoundly cynical belief that the innocent simply haven't been proved guilty yet.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca.

Coming to an ID Card Near You: Your DNA

One of the many disgraceful aspects about the disgraceful ID card programme is the reluctance of the UK government to make key documents available. For such a momentous change in the relationship of government to governed, it is critically important that a full debate about all the issues be conducted; but without key details of the scheme, that is made more difficult – which is presumably why the UK government has resisted the publication of the so-called “Gateway reviews” so long.

Finally, though, we have gained the right to see these somewhat outdated documents. Despite their age, and the unnecessary redactions, some useful new information has come to light, which more than justifies the long battle to gain access.

On Open Enterprise blog.

Opening a Digital Pandora's Box

This stuff is getting, er, interesting:

There are already whispers circulating that “amended” copies of the BNP member list are doing the rounds on Bitorrent. People are settling scores with neighbours by adding them to a bogus BNP list. The potential for abuse is sky-high.

Yes, indeedy. Imagine what fun people will have in the future distributing similarly erroneous versions of the Compulsory UK DNA database once it's introduced as an indispensable aid in the Fight against Terruh (and then lost along with all the other government databases....)

Drowning in the DNA Database

Well, well, well:

The number of crimes solved thanks to the DNA database is actually falling despite the ever-growing number of people it contains.

Figures given to Parliament show that even though 7 per cent of the UK population are now on the DNA database it helped solve only 0.36 per cent of crimes, down from 0.37 per cent last year. In the same period over half a million people have been added to the database.

In fact there has been no big improvement in convictions since 2000/2001 when the database contained just 1.2 million people but was useful in 0.29 per cent of recorded crimes.

In other words, the database contained most of the useful DNA eight years ago: since then, it's been one long fishing expedition, adding more DNA for the sake of it - just in case. As the figures prove, the vast majority of that DNA is of innocent people who are are apparently unlikely ever to commit a crime. The only possible reason for retaining it is because of the insane authoritarian urges of the present government.

And what on earth does this quote from the Home Office mean?

The benefits of the NDNAD lie not only in detecting the guilty but in eliminating the innocent from inquiries

The only way the innocent could be eliminated is if their DNA had a flag "innocent" against it, which would make their presence in the database ridiculous. Assuming such a flag does not exist, how on earth does having some people's DNA - past offenders and innocent bystanders - help to eliminate the innocent?

Lords, Bless 'Em

More sanity from the House of Lords:

The government has been defeated in the House of Lords over the issue of keeping peoples' DNA and fingerprints on the police national database.

Peers backed a Conservative amendment calling for national guidelines for deleting material by 161 votes to 150.

Ministers said the safeguard was not needed and could hinder anti-terror operations but critics said innocent people should not be stigmatised.

The safeguard was not needed, presumably, because we no longer have any right to be regarded as innocent until proven guilty - the government's operating principle being that we are *all* potential terrorists, and therefore should *all* be under surveillance at all times and in all ways.

Why DNA Databases Are Doomed

I've been against DNA databases for years, but I've always felt that the generic arguments I've been using were a little pallid, shall we say. And now, in what amounts to almost a throwaway comment, the wonderful Reg gives me what I've been looking for:

Although police are keen to bang the drum for cases where DNA evidence has proved vital, there are obvious privacy objections as well as fears that over-reliance on DNA evidence will lead criminals to use it as an alibi - infecting a crime scene with someone else's DNA.

At the moment, there's not much point doing that because DNA isn't regarded as as an indispensable, infallible tool. Put everyone's DNA in a database, and the police are bound to get lazy - that's human nature - using it as a quick and foolproof method for finding perpetrators.

At that point, it will be worth seeding crime scenes with some judiciously-chosen DNA - secure in the knowledge that the rozzers will be able to work out whose it is. At this point, DNA begins to lose its value, as everyone starts sprinkling the stuff everywhere, utterly confusing the DNA bloodhounds.

And so, inevitably, we will be left with a huge DNA database, useless for its original purpose, built at enormous cost, posing an even huger security risk. Great. Not.

Our Chains Will Make Us Free

How Orwellian is this:

UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown has defended the apparatus of the UK's emerging surveillance society as the means to bring liberty to the people.

Britain's infamous identity cards, CCTV, biometrics and DNA scanners will make people more free by making them more secure, he said yesterday in defence of his security strategy.

Brown has seriously lost it.

Greenies Go Open

Pretty much a marriage made in heaven:

Open source software should be more widely available in order to help reduce the 'digital divide', according to Dr Caroline Lucas, Green MEP for the South East.

Dr Lucas has added her signature to a written declaration in the European Parliament - like an Early Day Motion (EDM) in the House of Commons - recognising the growing disparities in access to information and communication technologies throughout the European Union, and calling for increased use of open source technology.

She said: "The establishment of a digital divide is a new cause of social disparity which risks further excluding populations that are already vulnerable.

"New digital technologies have become an essential tool in all areas of life, including employment, education, and in personal leisure activities.

"European citizens have the right to freely access documents and information from the institutions which represent them, and it is about time that the use of open source software became more widespread.

"The European Union should take the necessary measures to help finance public research on open source software, and Parliament to switch its whole computer network to this type of technology.

Not that this is really a party issue: open source makes sense whatever your political persuasion, as David Cameron's increasing enthusiasm for it shows. Strange that only Labour doesn't get it: perhaps it's just too antithetical to its Stalinist positions on interception, internment without trial, ID cards, DNA databases et al.

Why You Should Boycott the UK Biobank

I first came across proposals for the the UK Biobank when I was writing Digital Code of Life in 2004. It's an exciting idea:

UK Biobank aims to study how the health of 500,000 people, currently aged 40-69, from all around the UK is affected by their lifestyle, environment and genes. The purpose of this major project is to improve the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of a wide range of illnesses (such as cancer, heart disease, diabetes, dementia, and joint problems) and to promote health throughout society.

By analysing answers, measurements and samples collected from participants, researchers may be able to work out why some people develop particular diseases while others do not. This should help us to find new ways to prevent early death and disability from many different diseases.

It's all about scaling: when you have vast amounts of information about populations, you can find out all kinds of correlations that would otherwise be obscured.

But as I noted in my book:

Meanwhile, the rise of biobanks - massive collections of DNA that may, like those in Iceland and Estonia, encompass an entire nation - will create tempting targets for data thieves.

This was well before the UK government started losing data like a leaky tap. Naturally, the UK Biobank has something to say on this issue:

Access is kept to a minimum. Very few staff have access to the key code. The computers which hold your information are protected by industry strength firewalls and are tested, so they are safe from hackers.

Sigh. Let's hope they know more about medical research than they do computer security.

But such security intrusions are not my main concern here. Again, as I wrote four years ago:

Governments do not even need to resort to underhand methods: they can simply arrogate to themselves the right to access such confidential information wherever it is stored. One of the questions addressed by the FAQ of a biobank involving half a million people, currently under construction in the United Kingdom, is: "Will the police have access to the information?" The answer - "only under court order" - does not inspire confidence.

I gathered from this blog post that invites are now going out, so I was interested to see what the UK Biobank has to say on the subject now that it has had time to reflect on matters:

Will the police have access to the information?

We will not grant access to the police, the security services or to lawyers unless forced to do so by the courts (and, in some circumstances, we would oppose such access vigorously).

"In some circumstances" - well, thanks a bunch. Clearly, nothing has changed here. The UK government will be able to waltz in anytime it wants and add those temping half a million DNA profiles to the four million it already has. After all, if you have nothing to hide, you can't possibly object.

Given the UK government's obsession with DNA profiles, and its contempt for any idea of privacy, you would be mad to sign up for the UK Biobank at present. Once your DNA is there (in the form of a blood sample), the only thing keeping it out of the government's hands is a quick vote in a supine Parliament.

Much as I'd like to support this idea, I won't have anything to do with it until our glorious leaders purge the current DNA database of the millions of innocent people - and *children* - whose DNA it holds, and shows itself even vaguely trustworthy with something as precious and quintessential as our genomes. And if the UK Biobank wants any credibility with the people whose help it needs, it would be saying the same thing.

DNA = Don't Need it All

A group of eminent lawyers and scientists is calling for anyone not convicted of a crime to have their details wiped from the DNA database.

The Nuffield Council on Bioethics said it is "unjustified" to keep people on the National DNA Database when they have not been convicted of any offence.

Some four million DNA samples are on the police's database.

Good to see some sensible thinking in this area; pity the government won't take a blind bit of notice.

Crowdsourcing Sousveillance

I wrote recently about Microsoft's amazing Photosynth demo, which shows pictures of Notre-Dame taken from Flickr stitched together automatically to produce a three-dimensional model that you can zoom into in just about any way.

Then I read this:

Madeleine McCann's parents will appeal to Irish tourists to check holiday snaps for clues - while the flat their child was abducted from reportedly sold for half price.

Madeleine's parents Kate McCann, 38, and Gerry, 39, will appear on television to ask anyone who took a trip to Portugal in early May to send photos to British investigators.

It occurred to me that what we really need is a system that can take these holiday snaps and put them together in time to create a four-dimensional model that can be explored by the police - a new kind of crowdsourced sousveillance.

Given that Photosynth is still experimental, we're probably some way off this. I'd also have concerns about handing over all this information to the authorities without better controls on what would be done with it (look what's happening with the UK's DNA database.)

DNA Database Delirium

Talking of DNA databases:

Civil liberties groups are warning that the details of every Briton could soon be on the national DNA database, raising fresh concerns of a 'surveillance society'. Controversial plans being studied by the government would see the DNA of people convicted of even the most minor, non-imprisonable offences, such as dropping litter, entered on the national database.
Madness.

But there's one tiny ray of hope:

Privately, the Home Office anticipates a public backlash against the proposals. 'This is a completely open exercise,' one Home Office source said. 'If there is overwhelming opposition against this we will not go there.'

So we know what we must do.

Googling the Genome, Part III

Good to see some others concerned by the imminent arrival of personal genomics:

In addition, many scientists fear cheap genome sequencing could have other, worrying consequences. Professor Steve Jones of University College London, said: 'If you make your genome public, you are not just revealing information about yourself and what diseases you might be susceptible to, you are also giving away crucial data about the kind of illnesses your children might be prone to. Each of your children gets half your genes, after all. They might not want the world to know about the risks they face and become very unhappy in later life that you went public. Your other relatives might equally be displeased.'

And by its implications for civil liberties:

However, there are other concerns, as Professor Ashburner points out. 'Anyone who commits relatively minor offences can have their DNA taken and analysed. At present, the main use of this process is to create a DNA fingerprint that can be used to identify that individual. But soon we will be able to create an entire genome sequence of that individual from a swab or blood sample. We will end up knowing everything about their genes. In the end, we could have millions of people on a database and know every single genetic secret of each person. That has to be a very worrying prospect.'