UK Data Retention Double Standards

As we know, the UK government intends to force UK ISPs to store vast amounts of data about our online activities. The idea that this might be an undue burden is dismissed out of hand. But what do we now read about using intercept evidence in court?

Lord Carlile said the long-term aim was to introduce intercept evidence, but the circumstances were not yet right.

"Before intercept evidence can be useful in court it has to be able to satisfy two broad tests," he said. "It has to be legally viable and it has to be practically viable.

"I suspect that [the government] may well say that neither of those broad tests have been met."

He said that under European human rights law all material intercepted during the course of an inquiry would have to be available at trial, possibly several years later.

The practical means to electronically store that much data did not currently exist, he said.

Obviously the government's intercept data is special heavy *pixie* data that can't be stored on ordinary technology in the same way that the terabytes of *ordinary* ISP data can...

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Policing the Function Creep...

Remember how the poor darlings in the UK government absolutely *had to* allow interception of all our online activities so that those plucky PC Plods could maintain their current stunning success rate in their Whirr on Terruh and stuff like that? Well, it seems that things have changed somewhat:

Detectives will be required to consider accessing telephone and internet records during every investigation under new plans to increase police use of communications data.

The policy is likely to significantly increase the number of requests for data received by ISPs and telephone operators.

Just as every investigation currently has to include a strategy to make use of its subjects' financial records, soon CID officers will be trained to always draw up a plan to probe their communications.

The plans have been developed by senior officers in anticipation of the implementation of the Interception Modernisation Programme (IMP), the government's multibillion pound scheme to massively increase surveillance of the internet by storing details of who contacts whom online.

Er, come again? "CID officers will be trained to always draw up a plan to probe their communications"? How does that square with this being a special tool for those exceptional cases when those scary terrorists and real hard naughty criminals are using tricky high-tech stuff like email? Doesn't it imply that we are all terrorist suspects and hard 'uns now?

Police moves to prepare for the glut of newly accessible data were revealed today by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Janet Williams. She predicted always considering communications data will lead to a 20 per cent increase in the productivity of CID teams.

She told The Register IMP had "informed thinking" about use of communications data, but denied the plans gave the lie to the government line that massively increased data retention will "maintain capability" of law enforcement to investigate crime.

Well, Mandy Rice-Davies applies, m'lud...

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Facebook Users of the World, Unite!

Maybe this is the way to get the huddled masses roused up against the insane and disproportionate Interception Modernisation Programme:

The U.K. government is considering the mass surveillance and retention of all user communications on social-networking sites, including Facebook, MySpace, and Bebo.

Vernon Coaker the U.K. Home Office security minister, on Monday said the EU Data Retention Directive, under which Internet service providers must store communications data for 12 months, does not go far enough. Communications such as those on social-networking sites and via instant-messaging services could also be monitored, he said.

"Social-networking sites such as MySpace or Bebo are not covered by the directive," said Coaker, speaking at a meeting of the House of Commons Fourth Delegated Legislation Committee. "That is one reason why the government (is) looking at what we should do about the Intercept(ion) Modernisation Programme, because there are certain aspects of communications which are not covered by the directive."

Monitoring Face, MySpace, Bebo: just think of the embarrassing/illegal things you mentioned there. Now, do you really want a bunch of control freaks sifting through *that* little lot?

gIMP My Foot

Jackboot Jacqui is at it again:

The government Interception Modernisation Programme (gIMP), a plan by spy chiefs to centrally collect details of every phone call, text, email and web browsing session of every UK resident, will be in place by 2012, according to a Home Office minister.

Apparently:

because communications providers already hold information about who contacts whom, when and how, the gIMP would not represent a major change. "We are not proposing that data that have never been collected are held," he said. "The question is how in the future, with all the changes that are coming we can still have access to something that we regularly use today for serious crime and counterterrorism." The final system will be fully compatible with human rights legislation, he said.

This shows once again that the Government either doesn't understand - or feigns not to understand - that putting together disparate information *is* a huge change, precisely because it allows all kinds of *new* info to be gathered about the public thanks to correlations and cross-linkings that are not evident when the data is held separately. Crudely speaking, this is putting together the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle to see something whole.

Oh Irony, Thy Name is Labour

How does the Labour government manage to do it? Just as they let out a few sly leaks about their super-duper cure-everything Interception Modernisation Programme - basically the ultimate in data mining for info against those terribly naughty bad chaps, all for a measly £12 billion because, you know, we're rolling in it, right? - we have, with stunning timing, the following:

The most extensive government report to date on whether terrorists can be identified through data mining has yielded an important conclusion: It doesn't really work.

A National Research Council report, years in the making and scheduled to be released Tuesday, concludes that automated identification of terrorists through data mining or any other mechanism "is neither feasible as an objective nor desirable as a goal of technology development efforts." Inevitable false positives will result in "ordinary, law-abiding citizens and businesses" being incorrectly flagged as suspects.

The whopping 352-page report, called "Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists," amounts to at least a partial repudiation of the Defense Department's controversial data-mining program called Total Information Awareness, which was limited by Congress in 2003.

Let's hope the Nu Poodles ares sufficiently sycophantic to pay attention to what their lords and master in the US say, even if they won't listen to the pleadings from the serfs they rule.

And talking of IT screw-ups from Labour, here's a very timely post from that one-man investigative marvel, Tony Collins:

All governments have unsung IT successes and large failures. But New Labour has had more big government IT-based calamities on general exhibit than any government we can remember, despite earnest attempts to learn lessons.

The Party's record was summed up in November 2004 by the National Audit Office, whose reports are always carefully-worded. It said, "The government has a poor record on delivering successful large IT-based projects and programmes." That perception remains today.

He has this perceptive analysis of why Labour has gone data-mad:

Building a bridge from the US to England may seem a good idea in theory but it is not practical. Yet ministers embarked on the technological equivalent with the NHS's £12.7bn National Programme for IT because nobody they would want to listen to told them it was fanciful.

One reason so many large public sector projects fail is that executives from some IT suppliers regularly propose to government unrealistic but ostensibly credible and beneficial solutions to problems civil servants did not know existed until suppliers explained what could be achieved with new technology.

The tenacity of some suppliers wears down civil servants. Indeed the centralising, self-aggrandising, and self-expanding instincts of bureaucracies play perfectly into the hands of some IT sales teams who understand the "transformational" agendas of successive governments.