02 January 2016

TTIP Update III

It's been fairly quiet on the TAFTA/TTIP front recently.  That's largely because Europe shuts down for its summer hols during August, and has only just got going again.  Unfortunately (for TAFTA/TTIP), the next round of negotiations has just been cancelled because the US administrations was busy being, er, not busy.  But as a consolation prize, we have a couple of documents from the European Commission on the subject of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), which by a happy coincidence was the subject of my previous TTIP Update.

In fact, those two documents turns out to be pretty much the same, just re-worded slightly.  Both seek to defend the indefensible – that is, to convince people that ISDS is totally harmless, and nothing to worry our pretty heads about.  Above all, they want to reassure us that ISDS is definitely not this years' ACTA....

This comes through most clearly in the document entitled "Incorrect claims about investor-state dispute settlement" [pdf].  So let's have a look at some of the claims about the claims:

Claim: Investor-state dispute settlement subverts democracy by allowing companies to go outside national legal systems.

Response: Untrue! To get a sense of perspective on this question it is important to remember that the EU itself, as well as all but one of our Member States, Switzerland, the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea and India - to name just a few - are all party to many agreements which provide for investor-state dispute settlement. These countries, and many more that also allow investor state dispute settlement, have healthy, vibrant democracies.

More specifically, relying on the national courts of the host country to enforce obligations in an investment agreement is not always easy.

Firstly, the investor may not want to bring an action against the host country in that country's courts because they might be biased or lack independence.

Secondly, investors might not be able to access the local courts in the host country. There are examples of cases where countries have expropriated foreign investors, not paid compensation and denied them access to local courts. In such situations, investors have nowhere to bring a claim, unless there is an investor-state dispute settlement provision in the investment agreement.

Thirdly, countries do not always incorporate the rules they sign up to in an investment agreement into their national laws. When this happens, even if investors have access to local courts, they may not be able to rely on the obligations the government has committed itself to in the agreement.


All that sounds plausible, until you remember that TTIP is an agreement between the EU and US, nobody else.  So let's look at the above "explanation" in that light:

"Firstly, the investor may not want to bring an action against the host country in that country's courts because they might be biased or lack independence. "

So the European Commission is saying that the US courts are biased or lack independence?  I do hope Karel de Gucht explains why when negotiating with his US counterparts.

"Secondly, investors might not be able to access the local courts in the host country. "

So here the European Commission is saying that investor might not be able to access local courts in the US? Sure, that happens all the time....

"Thirdly, countries do not always incorporate the rules they sign up to in an investment agreement into their national laws."

So now the Commission thinks that the US will go to the trouble of negotiating this huge treaty – and then just ignore its provisions?  Again, how plausible is that as an answer? 

And notice that none of the three points actually addresses the key issue, which is that ISDS does indeed allow companies to go outside national legal systems, and thus subvert established democratic institutions like the local courts. Basically, ISDS is inappropriate for developed nations like the EU and US.  Introducing it does one thing, and one thing only: provides foreign investors with extra rights over and above what ordinary citizens and domestic companies enjoy.

So let's look at another:

Claim: Investor-state allows companies to sue just because they might lose profits.

Response: Wrong! Companies cannot sue successfully just because their profits might be affected. They need to have a case. That means they need to prove that one or more of the investment protection standards, such as non-discrimination or protection against unlawful expropriation have not been respected. The fact that a government changes a law, which increases the costs for a given company, is not on its own, sufficient to bring a successful case in investor-state dispute settlement.


Although it's strictly speaking true that companies cannot sue *just* because they might lose profits, in practice that's pretty much what happens, because the so-called "investment protection standards" are so vague and easy to invoke.  Here's a good explanation from Public Citizen:

Investors and corporations can demand taxpayer compensation for policies that they allege as violating special “rights” granted to foreign investors by NAFTA-style FTAs. These “rights” are phrased in vague, broad language. Tribunals have increasingly interpreted these foreign investor “rights” to be far more expansive than those afforded to domestic firms, such as the “right” to a regulatory framework that conforms to a corporation’s “expectations.” This “right” has been interpreted to mean that governments should make no changes to regulatory policies once a foreign investment has been established.

Claim: Investor-state dispute settlement cases take place behind closed doors

Response: Many existing agreements do indeed provide, by default, that investment disputes are heard behind closed doors. The EU does not believe that is appropriate. We have championed transparency in international dispute settlement in general and in investor-state dispute settlement in particular. In future EU agreements, all submissions will be public, all hearings will be open, all decisions of the tribunal shall be public and interested parties will be able to make their views known.


So the response here is more along the lines of "well, yes, that's true, but we'd really like to change it."  Unfortunately, that overlooks the fact that it can't do that unilaterally: it needs to get the US to agree, and the current administration has shown itself a bigger enemy of transparency than any predecessor.  Bottom line: it's not going to happen.

Claim: Investor-state dispute settlement undermines public choices (e.g. Vattenfall challenging the German moratorium on nuclear power, Philip Morris challenging Australia’s plain packaging regime for cigarettes)

Response: It is important to note that only well-founded cases have a chance of being successful. The fact that a policy has been challenged does not mean that the challenge will be successful. The EU will negotiate in such a way so as to ensure that legislation reflecting legitimate public choices e.g. on the environment, cannot be undermined through investor-state dispute settlement.


Well, see comment above: the EU can negotiate until it's blue in the face, but if the US refuses to go along with the plan, then the situation remains the same.  And here's what currently happening: a wide range of health, safety and environmental regulations are being challenged through the ISDS mechanism:

foreign corporations have launched investor-state challenges against a wide array of consumer health and safety policies, environmental and land-use laws, government procurement decisions, regulatory permits, financial regulations and other public interest polices that they allege as undermining “expected future profits.”

Claim: Investor-state dispute settlement is biased in favour of investors – they can threaten to bring expensive cases against governments and so scare them away from policies that the investors do not like.

Response: There is little real world evidence that this is the case. UN statistics on investor state dispute settlement cases show that a majority of cases are decided in favour of the government (Of all the cases concluded by 2012, 42% found in favour of the State, 31% in favour of the investor and 27% were settled).


This is an absolutely key issue.  ISDS actions threaten to become the global version of patent trolls: by merely threatening to sue they can cause cautious governments to change their plans.  Notice how the European Commission quotes the figures for "all the cases concluded by 2012".  That conveniently bundles together all the early cases where tribunals did, indeed, tend to find for the State more often.  But unfortunately for the European Commission's argument, that's no longer the case.  Here's what the UN statistics have to say about 2012:

In 70% of the public decisions addressing the merits of the dispute, investors’ claims were accepted, at least in part.

Next:

Claim: Investor-state dispute settlement cases are decided by a small clique of lawyers, with considerable conflicts of interest, who seek to cream off public money.

Response: Like in any area of national or international law the number of true specialist lawyers in the field is not large. Some of these lawyers do combine roles as arbitrators in some disputes and advocates in others. This crossing over may create the risk of conflicts of interest.


In other words, this is also true, but we would like to change it (see above).

Finally, we have:

Claim: Investors should not be allowed to challenge governments directly in international law. Only governments should be able to act against each other, via state-to-state dispute settlement.

Response: It is investors who actually suffer the financial losses. Governments (including the EU) need to pursue the general interest, and that means that they have neither the time nor the resources to follow-up each individual alleged breach of the agreement.


The fact that governments (including the EU) have neither the time nor resources to deal with each alleged breach is precisely why ISDS is so pernicious: it forces governments (or the EU) to spend huge amounts of time and money dealing with claims made under it.  The fact that tribunals are finding increasingly often in favour of companies means that more cases will be brought, because the odds of succeeding are going up, especially if speculative funding is available.

And here's another reason why that growth in ISDS trolling is likely to happen: last year saw the largest award made by an ISDS tribunal – a cool $1.77 billion in damages.  And remember, that's money that the government concerned has to pay.  If ISDS is included in TAFTA/TTIP, the people who will end up footing the not inconsiderable bills will be you and me.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and on Google+

TTIP Update II

As I noted in my first TTIP Update about the current negotiations between the EU and US over a massive trade agreement that is far from being only about trade, it is probably true that it will not include many of the more outrageous ideas found in ACTA last  year.  But that is not to say that TTIP does not threaten many key aspects of the Internet – just that the attack is much more subtle.

The problem is the inclusion of "investor-state dispute settlement" (ISDS).  This began as a perfectly reasonable attempt to ensure that investments in developing countries were not unlawfully expropriated by rogue governments.  The idea was that if such an event occurred, and the local government refused to compensate the investor, the latter had recourse to independent international courts that considered the case and awarded damages that could be levied against the government in question in other ways – for example, seizing their assets abroad.

Sadly, a sensible idea in one context has been seized upon by opportunists and applied in a context where it's quite inappropriate.  In particular, companies are using ISDS against governments in Western countries.  That's not necessary, because those countries already have extremely well-developed legal systems that allow the courts to consider allegations of expropriation by governments there.  But companies have realised that ISDS tribunals give them an amazingly powerful way to overrule a country's laws.  The following case illustrates how this works in practice.

It involves the US drug company Eli Lilly and Company, which has invoked the ISDS clause in the North American Free Trade Agreement signed between Canada and the US (and Mexico).  Here's the background:

Eli Lilly launched its NAFTA attack after Canadian courts invalidated Eli Lilly’s monopoly patent rights for an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) drug called Strattera. The Canadian courts did so after determining that Eli Lilly had presented insufficient evidence (a single study involving 22 patients) when filing for the patent to show that Strattera would deliver the long-term benefits promised by the company. While the $100 million NAFTA investor-state compensation demand relates to revocation of the Strattera patent, Eli Lilly makes clear in its formal “Notice of Intent” to Canada that it is not only challenging the invalidation of its particular patent, but Canada’s entire legal doctrine for determining an invention’s “utility” and, thus, a patent’s validity. While pushing for an entirely different patent standard, Eli Lilly, the fifth-largest U.S. pharmaceutical corporation, is demanding $100 million from Canadian taxpayers as compensation for Canada’s enforcement of its existing patent standards.

In fact, Eli Lilly has now upped the stakes and demanded $500 million "compensation".

It's worth exploring what is going on here.  Canadian courts have determined that Eli Lilly did not meet the required standard in order to be granted a patent.  This is not a question of an arbitrary, or capricious act by some third-world dictator, but the final decision of a sovereign nation's highest court.  However, Eli Lilly is unwilling to accept that decision, and has invoked the ISDS clause in NAFTA in an attempt to overturn the ruling and demand money.  In other words, ISDS allows companies both to sue entire nations, and to ignore their laws.

Incredible though that may seem, here's why that is possible, as explained in the long and extremely detailed post from Public Citizen on the topic, quoted above:

The system elevates foreign corporations to the level of sovereign governments, uniquely empowering them to skirt domestic laws and courts and privately enforce the terms of a public treaty by directly challenging governments’ public interest policies before foreign tribunals.

The tribunals deciding these cases are comprised of three private sector attorneys, unaccountable to any electorate. Many of the tribunalists rotate between serving as “judges” and bringing cases for corporations against governments. Such dual roles would be deemed unethical in most legal systems. In this “club” of international investment arbitrators, there are fifteen lawyers who have been involved in 55 percent of the total international investment cases known today. The tribunals operate behind closed doors, and there are no meaningful conflict of interest rules with respect to arbitrators’ relationships with, or investments in, the corporations whose cases they are deciding.

Tribunalists are paid by the hour, creating an incentive for cases to drag out endlessly. Governments are often ordered to pay for a share of tribunal costs even when cases are dismissed. Given that the average costs for such procedures total $8 million, the mere filing of a case can create a chilling effect on government policy, even if the government expects to win. (In one challenge against the Philippines, the government’s tribunal and legal costs alone topped $50 million.) If a tribunal rules against a challenged policy, there is no limit to the amount of money the tribunal can order the government to pay the foreign corporation. The cases cannot be appealed on the merits. Countries may file for an “annulment” for certain specific categories of tribunal “error.” Annulment claims are not heard by domestic courts, but are decided by another tribunal comprised of private sector attorneys.

Investors and corporations can demand taxpayer compensation for policies that they allege as violating special “rights” granted to foreign investors by NAFTA-style FTAs. These “rights” are phrased in vague, broad language. Tribunals have increasingly interpreted these foreign investor “rights” to be far more expansive than those afforded to domestic firms, such as the “right” to a regulatory framework that conforms to a corporation’s “expectations.” This “right” has been interpreted to mean that governments should make no changes to regulatory policies once a foreign investment has been established.


Claiming such expansive protections, foreign corporations have launched investor-state challenges against a wide array of consumer health and safety policies, environmental and land-use laws, government procurement decisions, regulatory permits, financial regulations and other public interest polices that they allege as undermining “expected future profits.”


It's important to note that last point: ISDS allows companies to claim for not just alleged past losses, but also supposed loss of "expected future profits".  These, moreover can be "caused" simply by a government passing legislation that happens to reduce a sector's future profits.  They can include something as laudable as strengthening environmental protection, since the extra expense of meeting those more stringent standards would naturaly reduce profits.  Even though this was carried out legally by the government concerned, and in order to protect public health, ISDS clauses would allow a company to sue for the "expropriation" of future profits caused by this move.

Now let's look at this from the point of view of open souce and the Internet.  As the case involving Eli Lilly shows, patents are already being contested using ISDS tribunals.  One obvious situation where this might affect open source is in the area of software patents.  As I have pointed out many times, the situation in Europe is rather anomalous here.  Although the European Patent Convention explicitly rejects software patents ("as such"), the EPO continues to issue them using various formal tricks.  That's why there is continuing pressure to confirm the invalid nature of software patents nationally and at a European level.

But let's suppose that under the current TTIP treaty, ISDS is brought in between the US and EU.  US software companies could then point out that affirming the invalidity of software patents granted by the EPO would obviously reduce the value of those patents.  They would therefore doubtless claim that the European Union or member nations had "expropriated" that value, and demand compensation, just as Eli Lilly has for a patent that Canada decided should not be granted.

With the threat of dozens of huge companies threatening to sue Europe over tens of thousands of software patents, the European Union might decide that the cost of "compensating" them for their "loss" would be simply too great, and thus ultimately acquiesce in the grant of software patents, even though this was being imposed upon them.

But it's not just in the area of patents that the EU could find its hands tied.  The same applies to copyright.  For example, there are various areas where more flexibilities might be introduced into copyright law.  US publishers might claim that these would cause their future profits to be diminished, and sue the EU or nation states for daring to make this move.  Again, the scope for making changes to copyright law in the EU and in invidivudal nations would be greatly reduced for fear that deep-pocketed companies would start suing over things they didn't like – whether or not it was good for Europe and its public.

Similarly, I could imagine inventive lawyers trying to argue that the lack of harsh penalties for unauthorised sharing of copyright material in Europe causes US companies to "lose" profits as a result.  This threat might be used to "encourage" EU lawmakers to pass precisely the kind of laws that were envisaged in ACTA: for example, criminalising even small-scale copyright infringement, and encouraging ISPs to pass on personal information.

Another approach might be to claim that any moves to adopting open standards, which would provide a level playing field for open source, would cause profits for existing incumbents to drop.  They could then invoke ISDS and demand "compensation" for any such move.  The same would be true for any preference given to open source in government procurement.

In this way, the actual or threatened complaints under ISDS clauses would push the EU to bring in precisely the worst ideas of ACTA, but without needing to specify them.  So negotiators can claim quite truthfully that there will be no attempt to bring in ACTA by the backdoor; instead, they will just leave that to ISDS, which gives US corporations a weapon far more powerful than anything envisaged in ACTA.

And if you think I am exaggerating the scale of the threat here, take a look at this official report on ISDS by UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade And Development:

The Issues Note reveals that 62 new cases were initiated in 2012, which constitutes the highest number of known ISDS claims ever filed in one year and confirms that foreign investors are increasingly resorting to investor-State arbitration.

Foreign investors challenged a broad range of government measures, including changes to domestic regulatory frameworks (with respect to gas, nuclear energy, the marketing of gold, and currency regulations), as well as measures relating to revocations of licences (in the mining, telecommunications and tourism sectors). Investors also took action on the grounds of alleged breaches of investment contracts, alleged irregularities in public tenders, withdrawals of previously granted subsidies (in the solar energy sector), and direct expropriations of investments.

By the end of 2012, the total number of known cases reached 518, and the total number of countries that have responded to one or more ISDS claims increased to 95. The overall number of concluded cases reached 244. Out of these, approximately 42 per cent were decided in favour of the State and 31 per cent in favour of the investor. Approximately 27 per cent of the cases were settled.



Two of the most chilling facts are the following:

2012 saw some notable developments, including:

The highest monetary award in the history of ISDS (US$1.77 billion) in Occidental v. Ecuador, a case that arose out of unilateral termination by the State of an oil contract; and

The first treaty-based ISDS proceeding where an arbitral tribunal affirmed its jurisdiction over a counterclaim that had been lodged by a respondent State against the investor.


Remember, those awards would have to be paid by the state – that is, the people – and the same is true if ISDS cases come to Europe: it will be you and me who must pay because somebody claims that their future profits have been harmed in some way. 

Despite the very high stakes – we are talking many billions of Euros here – few seem to be aware of the serious threat that ISDS represents to national and European sovereignty.  We urgently need to make people and politicians aware of what is going on here before the ISDS mechanism is enshrined in TTIP for companies to use to attack both open source and the Internet in new and frighteningly effective ways.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and on Google+

TTIP Update I

Right at the start of this year I flagged up the likelihood that hugely important trade negotations between the EU and US were likely to start later this year.  A few months later, I gave some more background to that move, as well as the text of a document calling for the participants to avoid repeating the grave mistakes of ACTA, which ultimately led to that treaty being rejected in the European Parliament on July 4 last year.

Well, things have moved on since then, and the first round of negotations for what is now being called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership has taken place.  Here's part of the press release:

“It’s been a very productive week”, said EU Chief Negotiator Ignacio Garcia-Bercero coming out of the talks. “We have been striving already for many months to prepare the ground for an ambitious trade and investment deal that will boost the transatlantic economy, delivering jobs and growth for both European and Americans. This week we have been able to take this negotiation to the next step. The main objective has been met: we had a substantive round of talks on the full range of topics that we intend to cover in this agreement. This paves the way to for a good second round of negotiations in Brussels in October.”

Working throughout the week, the negotiating groups have set out respective approaches and ambitions in as much as twenty various areas that the TTIP - the biggest bilateral trade and investment negotiation ever undertaken - is set to cover. They included: market access for agricultural and industrial goods, government procurement, investment, energy and raw materials, regulatory issues, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, services, intellectual property rights, sustainable development, small- and medium-sized enterprises, dispute settlement, competition, customs/trade facilitation, and state-owned enterprises.

Negotiators identified certain areas of convergence across various components of the negotiation and - in areas of divergence – begun to explore possibilities to bridge the gaps.

The talks have been based on a thorough review of the stakeholders views expressed to date. The negotiators met also in the middle of the week with approximately 350 stakeholders from academia, trade unions, the private sector, and non-governmental organisations to listen to formal presentations and answer questions related to the proposed agreement.

The next round of TTIP negotiations will take place during the week of 7 October in Brussels.


Rather more interesting than this press release, the European Commission has issued a document entitled "How much does the TTIP have in common with ACTA?" [.pdf].   That picks up on a question posed in the TTIP FAQ:

Will the TTIP be ACTA through the back door?

To which the answer was:

No. – the 'Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement' – was intended to end the trade in counterfeited goods. It goes without saying that the position of the European Parliament – which voted against – will be fully respected. There will be no 'through the backdoor'.

That by itself was interesting, because it showed that the European Commission was at least aware that ACTA had been a disaster.  However, the latest document goes even further in trying to assuage concerns that TTIP is "ACTA by the backdoor":

In the debate around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), some commentators have tried to suggest that there is a conspiracy to use the negotiations to bring back parts of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). Some have even claimed that TTIP will be a "super- ACTA", aimed at attacking your online freedoms. These claims are – very simply – false. Let's look at them in two parts.

The first point addresses the following question: "Will TTIP be used to bring back controversial parts of the ACTA agreement?" To which the response is:

No. ACTA was negotiated between 37 countries with the aim of reducing international violations of intellectual property rights (IPR). The EU and 22 of its Member States signed the agreement, but it was eventually rejected by the European Parliament in June 2012.

The European Commission has no intention of doing anything that runs counter to the position of the European Parliament on this issue, so there is no question of reviving ACTA through the back door.

The TTIP will be a much broader agreement covering many economic sectors. Intellectual property rights issues – such as rules on copyrights and trademarks – will only be a relatively small element of it. In fact, given that both the EU and the US already have efficient rules for protecting IPR systems, they have limited interest in strengthening their enforcement provisions.

Since the beginning of the TTIP negotiating process, it is very clear that the eventual agreement on intellectual property rights will not include elements that were controversial in the context of ACTA. For example, the ACTA provisions on IPR enforcement in the digital environment (ACTA articles 27.2 to 27.4) will not be part of the negotiations. Neither will ACTA's provisions on criminal sanctions.


The other question is "Will TTIP bring in new provisions that would restrict internet freedom?", where we find the following subsidiary issues and answers:

The discussions on electronic commerce will undermine consumer protection, including on data privacy.

This is also untrue. The EU made it very clear that its standards of data privacy protection are not up for discussion in this agreement. They will not be weakened.

Various other aspects of the digital economy will however be covered by the negotiations to make sure that the rules we have on either side of the Atlantic do not unnecessarily act as barriers to trade. That is not the same thing as undermining the online protection of internet users.


Alas, this is not really the case.  As I've discussed in previous columns, there is a very serious assault on the privacy of Europeans online, with an attempt to water down the proposed Data Protection Regulation.  Privacy is perceived by the US companies like Google, Facebook et al. as a "barriers to trade", since it stops them having their way with our data.  In this respect, TTIP could seriously undermine our privacy if it enshrines the US approach - as in "zero privacy protection" - as applying to the EU.

The other subsidiary question and answer is as follows:

The talks will weaken cybersecurity

The European Union has expressed clearly its concerns on alleged US intelligence activities and their implication for privacy and data protection at European level. We are committed to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, but we insist – and the US has agreed – that in parallel there be work in two new EU-US working groups to analyse the oversight of intelligence activities, intelligence collection and also the question of privacy and data protection. These groups have already met and the EU expects that they will now make rapid progress. For the TTIP to be a success, we need confidence between the partners. And confidence can be only be fostered if there is a clarification of these issues of very serious concern. However, the TTIP negotiations themselves will not focus on these issues.


That inevitably implies that Europeans will be thrown to the wolves.  The separation of the discussions about spying and TTIP means the US can simply tell the EU to get knotted when it comes to complaints about the comprehensive surveillance being carried out on Europeans.  This was a major tactical error on the part of the European Commission, since its only leverage over the massive spying was TTIP, and to use the latter to pressure the US to respect local laws.  Now the EU cannot do that, so the working groups will come out with some pious platitudes that mean absolutely nothing in terms of safeguarding our online activity.

The new document concludes with another revealing section:

One last point: a more open process

The EU is committed to providing as much information as possible to the public, the media, and the many stakeholders as we proceed with the negotiations. There is more interest in this potential deal than any we have worked on before. We realise that this requires new initiatives to shed more light on what is going on throughout the negotiations. Several tools have been put in place:


Well, it would be hard to be more closed than ACTA, but nonetheless the following initiatives are all very welcome:

We have created a dedicated webpage to the TTIP negotiations. On this webpage, you can find a timeline, which details the events taking place, as well as providing overviews of the negotiating rounds.

We have also published a detailed Frequently Asked Questions page on the EU-US negotiations. This FAQ is available in all official EU languages and
gives an answer to many of the questions you may have.


Basic, but certainly useful.

The EU Commission's Trade Department now also has two dedicated Twitter accounts. One general account and one account specifically for the TTIP negotiations. The latter – @eu_ttip_team – is managed directly by negotiators and gives you a behind the scenes look at how the negotiations are progressing. We tweet in real time and give you updates on the negotiations as well as details on where to find more relevant info online. The team will also reply to your questions and comments.

That, I think, is much more important.  First, because it shows that the European Commission recognises that Twitter is one of the most important ways of communicating these days.  And secondly, it accepts that it is a medium for receiving questions and comments - that is, a two-way channel.

All-in-all, the appearance of this document from the European Commission is extremely welcome.  It signals a new awareness of how much the public cares about key areas affecting the Internet, and for the need to explain policies, rather than simply to impose them. 

Of course, these are still baby steps.  What we really need are for all tabled documents - which, by definition, are no longer secret - to be made available to the public immediately.  Although that might seem unlikely, the victory over ACTA, and the fact that the European Commission felt obliged to release the current explanation that TTIP is not an attempt to bring ACTA in by the back door, shows that public pressure does work.  In future updates, I will be explaining where in particular we need to apply that pressure - and how we might do it most effectively.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and on Google+

The Rise and Fall of TTIP, As Told in 51 Updates

This year will be make or break for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).  It is already years behind its original, hopelessly-optimistic schedule, and is now running into immovable political events in the form of the US Presidential elections, and the general elections in Germany.  If TTIP isn't wrapped up this year, it is probably dead until whenever the next attempt to push through such a global takeover of democracy begins, as it surely will.

From July 2013 until April 2015 I wrote a series of irregular TTIP Updates, which charted the latest developments of the negotiations.  They form the most detailed description of how TTIP emerged and developed during the first two years of the negotiations.  Although superseded by more recent events, they nonetheless offer a historical record of what happened during that time, and may help people understand the strange beast that is TTIP somewhat better.

These Updates were published on Computerworld UK, which has a Web page with consolidated links to the updates.  Unfortunately, re-designs and other changes at the site have led to link-rot setting in.  Although the Computerworld UK page remains the main site for these Updates, I thought it would be useful - and prudent - to offer a mirror here on Open....

Below I have linked to the mirrored Updates, which appear as separate posts on the present blog.  Since I can't extract the final versions of the columns from the Computerworld UK site, I've used my local files.  These may differ slightly from the final, published versions - if there's anything major, I'll try to edit them at some stage.  Similarly, there may be odd typos that I have missed; please feel free to point them out in the comments so that I can fix them.

I should also warn readers that there are many broken links, especially to other Computerworld UK columns, whose URLs have all changed.  If I have time, I will try to fix the more important ones of these, but given that I probably won't have time, please don't hold your breath...

Although I am unlikely to write any more updates, I am most certainly going to keep covering TTIP during this crucial year - indeed, I intend to up my coverage considerably to reflect the crucial stage of the negotiations we have now reached.  I've already written a couple of big features on the topic for Ars Technica UK, which serve as introductions to this whole area for those coming to it for the first time, and as summaries of what has happened for those who are already familiar with the main issues.

The first, entitled "TTIP explained: The secretive US-EU treaty that undermines democracy", is a 6000-word backgrounder to the whole area.  The more recent "How EU nations are being sued for billions by foreign companies in secret tribunals" concentrates on perhaps the most controversial - and dangerous - aspect of TTIP, the so-called "investor-state dispute settlement" (ISDS) mechanism that essentially places companies above national laws by giving them special tribunals in which they can sue governments for alleged "indirect expropriation" of future profits.

If you don't know about this aspect - or about TTIP in general - this is a good place to start.  Once you find out what is proposed for TTIP, I am sure that you will be outraged, and hope that you will join me in trying to do something about it.

TTIP Update l

A review of the few details that emerged from the first round of negotiations, including an attempt by the European Commission to convince us that TAFTA/TTIP is not another ACTA.

TTIP Update ll

An introduction to investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS), and why its presence in TAFTA/TTIP is a grave threat to European sovereignty, open source and the Internet.

TTIP Update III

A point-by-point rebuttal of a document in which the European Commission tries to prove that the presence of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in TTIP is not a problem.

TTIP Update IV

An exploration of how the public is kept in the dark over TAFTA/TTIP, and the dangerous asymmetries it contains.

TTIP Update V

A discussion of a major Wikileaks document discussing intellectual monopolies in TAFTA/TTIP’s sister agreement, TPP, and what it means for TTIP.

TTIP Update VI

An analysis of a leaked document outlining the European Commission’s communication strategy for TAFTA/TTIP, and a look at how disastrous other trade agreements like NAFTA and KORUS have been.

TTIP Update VII

Yet another, increasingly desperate attempt to justify the unjustifiable inclusion of ISDS in TAFTA/TTIP, and why the arguments simply don’t stand up to scrutiny.

TTIP Update VIII

Lifting the lid on how a new transatlantic “TTIP Regulatory Council” would bring in massive deregulation, with a consequent lowering of food, health and environmental standards in Europe.

TTIP Update IX

How an astonishing attack on Corporate Europe Observatory reveals a floundering European Commission increasingly concerned that it is losing control of the TAFTA/TTIP debate.

TTIP Update X

Another (failed) attack, this time by Karel De Gucht, the EU's trade commissioner, who laughably tries to claim that there is no lack of transparency in the TAFTA negotiations, and that it’s worth accepting the threats posed by ISDS.

TTIP Update XI

So it looks like TAFTA/TTIP is, in fact, ACTA by the backdoor – despite what Mr De Gucht has said...

TTIP Update XII

Why the US Fast Track bill guarantees that TAFTA's ISDS chapter will be one-sided and unfair for EU companies.

TTIP Update XIII

Big news: EU pulls ISDS to allow unprecedented public consultation; UK report says ISDS in TTIP would bring little or no benefit.

TTIP Update XIV

What new CETA leaks tell us about EU's plans to re-vamp ISDS - and why they aren’t enough to protect European sovereignty or democracy.

TTIP Update XV

There are growing calls to keep data protection out of TAFTA/TTIP – and to reject the agreement if the privacy of European citizens is not adequately protected.

TTIP Update XVI

More details emerge on ISDS provisions, and a rather ironic call for transparency from the paranoically opaque USTR.

TTIP Update XVII

Bad news, lots of leaks, plus debunking another misleading European Commission document.

TTIP Update XVIII

New leaks, new Web sites, a hidden threat from the “most-favoured nation” approach, and an astonishing claim that Germany wants ISDS out of TTIP.

TTIP Update XIX

A newly-discovered CETA bug shows why the European Commission needs transparency; also, why regulatory data must be opendata

TTIP Update XX

All about transparency in TTIP - or, rather, the almost complete lack of it; includes details of three phantom EU consultations I never heard about, and few took part in.

TTIP Update XXI

Why that best-case “ €119 bn” GDP boost to EU economy equates to just an extra cup of coffee every week.

TTIP Update XXII

ISDS attacks on EU nations have begun – and that’s before TTIP would make it even more likely and costly.

TTIP Update XXIII

Why the European Commission’s consultation on ISDS is a sham, and fails to provide the promised "draft".

TTIP Update XXIV

Looking at important research that finds even more holes in the European Commission’s TTIP justifications.

TTIP Update XXV

A report on a desperate high-level attempt by the US and EU to counter German scepticism, plus the video & slides of my re:publica 14 talk about why TTIP's numbers just don’t add up.

 TTIP Update XXVI

An action-packed update that includes fracking, water cannons and cosmetics – but still very little transparency.

TTIP Update XXVII

In which the European Commission’s misleading use of figures from its economic study is criticised, as is the study itself.

TTIP Update XXVIII

A major leak of EU services offer; an introduction to the top-secret TISA; and how the US it trying to buy love for TAFTA/TTIP.

TTIP Update XXIX

More on the secretive TISA negotiations; insight into the US's anti-transparency plans; and how the public is too stupid to understand TTIP.

TTIP Update XXX

More on the huge dangers of ISDS - and lots of help for responding to the European Commission’s travesty of a consultation on the same topic.

TTIP Update XXXI

Designed to be the final information on responding to the European Commission’s ISDS consultation, but we now learn the deadline has been extended because of huge numbers replying.

TTIP Update XXXII

A couple of interesting leaks, and a round-up of how TTIP is starting to enter the mainstream.

TTIP Update XXXIII

In the wake of the incredible 150,000 responses to the ISDS consultation, the revolt against this idea spreads to the highest reaches of the EU.

TTIP Update XXXIV

ISDS drama from Germany again, and how mutual recognition will undermine EU food and animal protection standards.

TTIP Update XXXV

The shape of multi-billion-pound ISDS lawsuits to come; a leak of the complete CETA agreement; and the threats lurking in US "certification".

TTIP Update XXXVI

Lots of news about CETA and ISDS, plus another slap in the face of the EU public.

TTIP Update XXXVII

Lots about CETA, and exciting plans for a European Citizens’ Initiative to let people make their views on TTIP known
TTIP Update XXXVIII

Slaps in the face of the EU public: a refusal to allow the ECI, and a "celebration" of CETA. Plus bad signs from the grilling of the new EU trade commissioner.

TTIP Update XXXIX

Nearly 50% of the claimed trade boost consists of swapping cars across the Atlantic.

TTIP Update XL

Rumours swirl that ISDS will come out of TTIP; even if it does, it's still in CETA and the new EU-Singapore free trade agreements.

TTIP Update XLI

Yet more sound and fury on the topic of ISDS in TTIP, but things remain as clear as mud.

TTIP Update XLII

Devasting new independent economic analysis of TTIP's likely effects on EU shows net losses in terms of GDP and 600,000 job losses.

TTIP Update XLIII

The problem of data flows, and why CETA's ISDS is a disaster.

TTIP Update XLIV

ISDS dangers in CETA and TTIP - and in the EU Singapore FTA.

TTIP Update XLV

They want "facts" and "hard evidence" about TTIP? Here they are...

TTIP Update XLVI

There are *already* more than €30 billion worth of ISDS claims against EU nations.

TTIP Update XLVII

The belated provision of improved transparency shows that public advocacy works.

TTIP Update XLVIII

The people have spoken: ISDS must go - no ifs, buts or maybes.

TTIP Update XLIX

New leaks show how transatlantic regulatory bodies will undermine EU and national sovereignty.

TTIP Update L
Should the views of a three-person tribunal take precedence over society's wishes?

TTIP Update LI

As resistance grows, TTIP is increasingly in trouble.